May 19 2010
Why Divestment Does Not Work
The modern human rights movements finally gained momentum in the 1970s and since then people have been seeking ways to pressure governments. In cases of state led genocide or systematic human rights violations people have turned to disinvestment or “divestment.” However, in the end of the day divestment is simply economic sanctions without teeth. In other words: ineffective. Divestment had some effect in South Africa but was not the death knell to Apartheid, it was completely ineffective in Sudan, and it is a waste of time in Israel.
Geopolitics, not divestment and humanitarian concerns, toppled the National Party and Apartheid in South Africa. The date of the end of Apartheid as official policy is significant – 1990 when President De Klerk announced that he would repeal the discriminatory laws. Five thousand miles away, the Berlin Wall fell four months earlier.
South Africa was the site of one of the many proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States supported the white National Party while the Soviet Union supported the ANC and many of South Africa’s antagonistic neighbors. As long as the Soviets maintained an influence in South Africa the United States government would continue supporting the National Party and Apartheid, since pressuring the South African government on Apartheid would potentially endanger a “vital partnership” in the fight against Communism. In 1990 the Soviets were gone and South Africa lost any strategic importance to the United States. With no more support from the United States, isolation from the international community, and continued domestic unrest from the ANC and other anti-Apartheid groups (after-all these were legitimate opposition groups and not Soviet pawns) the South African government had no choice but to end Apartheid.
Divestment did not have an effect until after the Berlin Wall fell. By this time divestment was backed by State support. Unlike other attempts at divestment, the anti-Apartheid movement gained national support in the US Congress and Senate which passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. President Reagan opposed the act (he even vetoed it although it was overridden) and did not seriously enforce it. As a result trade actually increased between South Africa and the United States between 1988 and 1998. By 1990 divestment had morphed into economic sanctions that were enforced by the state actors.
Divestment did nothing to stop genocide in Darfur. Initially the Bush Administration was hesitant call the conflict in Darfur genocide since the Government of Sudan had a role to play in the War on Terror. Furthermore, by the time the Save Darfur Coalition had raised enough international awareness the conflict had changed from genocide to civil war and civil unrest. As many observers predicted the conflict wore itself out although there is still no resolution to the violence.
The divestment that did occur had little to no effect on Sudan. In fact Sudan’s GDP grew 10% in 2006 and 2007. The difference between South Africa in 1990 and Sudan in the 2000 was globalization. For every “western” firm that pulled out of Sudan, a Chinese or Indian firm took its place. Under Clinton the United States imposed sanctions on Sudan due to its connections to international terrorism and human rights abuses in Southern Sudan. The US oil firms were forced to leave, but they were quickly replaced by the Chinese who now play a large role in the Sudanese economy. Due to this new dynamic, the United States is forced to negotiate with Russia and China to develop any credible international sanctions. If unilateral economic sanctions are no longer enough to force policy change then how can divestment that has no enforcement mechanism possibly be effective?
It is for these reasons that divestment cannot possibly work in Israel. Economically, divestment has some potential for success. Israel has very little friends outside Europe and the United States. China would be hesitant to invest in Israel because it would jeopardize its crucial investments and contracts in Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, in today’s globalized world it is more than likely that a budding firm from an emerging market would set up shop in Israel to make a quick buck in the absence of the large multinational firms. The problem with divestment in Israel is political. Like in South Africa, divestment will be ineffective as long as the US government supports the Israeli government. And the US is not going to be withdrawing its support from Israel anytime soon.
Israel has something that neither the Apartheid government or the Sudanese government had: AIPAC, the most powerful lobbying group in the country. South Africa or Sudan never had a strong lobbying in the US to argue on its behalf. Every major politician listens to AIPAC and seeks their endorsement. Immediately after Vice President Biden’s disastrous trip to Israel, Secretary of State Clinton was quick to speak before AIPAC on the importance of the US-Israel relationship. Effective divestment in Israel would require one of the government largest policy changes in history.
Divestment in Israel poses one last problem. The Israel-Palestine conflict is a security dilemma. Israel will not go to the negotiating table until it is certain that its borders and existence are secured. Palestine will not go to the table until Israel settlements and abuses stop. A divestment campaign that is aimed at targeted Israel’s ability to acquire defense weaponry will make Israel feel less secure. Meanwhile mortars and rockets will continue to enter Palestine. Divestment will not push Israel to the negotiating table.
Unfortunately, divestment is nothing more than a symbolic act that has very little effect on policy while hurting US businesses. American and European companies divested from Sudan and the Sudanese government found less squeamish firms and continued its genocidal policies. In South Africa divestment only had an effect once the United States was no longer willing to support the National Party. Divestment was then backed by political action but then this is no longer divestment but an economic sanction. Thus, in Israel divestment will never work until it is backed by political support from the United States government (essentially the US government placing sanctions on Israel).
In the last three decades there have been many attempts to democratize foreign policy. However, this immediately comes into conflict with an international system that only recognizes nation states as sovereign actors. People can divest and they can protest but in the end of the day the power to change foreign policy rests in the hands of the national foreign policy establishments.
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