Marin Forum

Why is NATO strong? Powerful economies, United States hegemony, and sophisticated weaponry all play a role in answering this question, but perhaps the most crucial answer is identity. A superpower can force a security organization into existence like the Warsaw Pact and economies can band together to defend their interests like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) but they need something more to sustain them. Formal institutions are important for sustainability but they do not explain how and why these organization are formed in the first place. Why does a nation enter into a security organization in the first place?

The obvious first answer is the presence of an external threat. But in order for that threat to be recognized there needs to be a “collective consciousness” or identity that identifies the threat as a threat. Let’s take the example of NATO. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the Western powers in response to potential aggression from the Soviet Union. And it was a defense pact for the idea of liberal democracy. Thus, identity has both an external and internal component. Externally it creates an “us” and “them” distinction; while internally it is a set of common values. A security organization arises when there is an external threat to a set of communal values that are worth protecting. Hence, the strength of the security organization will depend on the strength of the identity formation.

For example, the Warsaw Pact was never as strong as NATO despite far superior conventional forces because its internal identity was formed by Soviet hegemony. Communism was a foreign institution for the Eastern bloc whereas liberal democracy developed naturally in the NATO members. The Warsaw Pact quickly fell apart when the external identity dimension – the threat of Western military aggression – disappeared and the internal dimension – Communism supported by Soviet hegemony – dissolved.

Identity is a social construct so it can take an almost limitless number of forms. In security organizations one of the most common is an identity based on geography. NATO was the north Atlantic region (itself a social construct – prior to the twentieth century there was no concept of the North Atlantic region ) and later included all of Europe. SEATO was Southeast Asia (likewise Southeast Asia did not exist as a concept until after decolonization and has only recently been articulated as an identity). Religion has been another way to form an identity. Islamic countries formed the Organization of the Islamic Conference to safeguard their interests (although this is not a security organization). Race has been another common identity formation. The colonial powers entered into alliances with local tribes that appeared more Caucasian or “western.” Likewise, memos from the US State Department show officials hesitant to form alliances with “inferior Asiatic races.” A common history is a further source of identity formation. European nations entered alliances with their former colonies and the United States entered SEATO with the Philippines citing the common struggle against the Japanese. Lastly, identity can form around ideology or world view. The cornerstone of NATO is the protection of the liberal democratic world order. The League of Nations or the United Nations were formed on the liberal notions of world order. No particular identity construction is stronger than another since a certain construction will only become salient under certain conditions. In the United Nations, a multicultural organization, race plays little role in identity formation while ideology, the commitment to the UN Charter (a liberal document), is the key identity construct.

A security organization’s strength is related to the number of identity constructs present. NATO is strong because the geographic, racial, religious, historical, and ideological constructs are all present. The presence of numerous constructs allows the organization to emphasis or de-emphasis certain constructs based on the situation. Had NATO  been solely a religious organization (Christian-secular) it would have been very difficult  to incorporate Turkey (Islamic-secular). Instead NATO emphasized its  historical and ideological constructs (along with the external threat dimension) and as a result Turkey provides the second largest standing army in the NATO alliance. The presence of more constructs makes the organization more stable since when a certain construct becomes a volatile issue the organization can quickly shift its identity to a different construct.

The relationship between the internal and external formation of identity is vital for the strength of the organization. Just as the organization can shift its internal identity among its shared identity constructs, the organization can shift its emphasis between its internal and external identity formations. In the case of Turkey the threat of communism and the Soviet Union provided further reason to join NATO in the absence of shared internal identity constructs. Following the end of the Cold War NATO shifted its focus toward its internal identity formation in order to keep the alliance relevant as it lacked an external identity dimension. When both dimensions of identity are present the organization is strong as NATO was during the Cold War; if one dimension disappears than the organization will weaken over the long term.

Today commentators say that NATO is facing an “identity crisis.” And they are right because NATO has lost its external identity and could face an erosion of its internal identity. The threat is no longer coming from the Soviet Union or communism. The United States has tried to frame the threat as Islamic fundamentalism but not all NATO members view this threat on the same level as they did with communism. NATO enters the twenty-first century without a strong external identity dimension. Even internally NATO is showing some cracks. Eastward expansion threatens to undermine its internal identity. Liberal democracies with market economies in the North Atlantic region (and later nearly seamlessly expanded to the European continent) form NATO’s internal identity. Does the inclusion of Georgia in NATO undermine its liberal democracy identity? Historically not all members of NATO were liberal democracies, but in today’s NATO Portugal, Spain, and Greece are democracies and Turkey is democratizing. Clearly the inclusion of Israel or Iraq (as some have suggested) would undermine its geographic identity. Thus, NATO’s problems are not caused by weakening institutions, transatlantic bickering, or the decline of the United States’ unipolar moment, but the erosion of the elements that formed NATO’s identity.

What are the implications for a European Union defense organization? At the moment the outlook is bleak. Externally, an EU Security Organization faces the same dilemma as NATO. There is no clear external threat to the EU especially since terrorism is not as big of a focus for Europeans as it is for the United States. Internally, there is no agreement on what constitutes a European identity or if it even exists. There is an elite identity for Europe that has been at the heart of European integration (an economically prosperous and peaceful Europe that is a beacon for democratic values, international law, and human rights) but it remains just that – a viewpoint held by Eurocrats in Brussels. There is nothing to stand up against nor anything to protect. Thus, a EU security organization is not possible until there is an external tangible and serious threat to the EU or a common salient European identity.

Identity tells us what to cherish and who are our enemies. Without identity there is no reason to form a security organization because there is nothing to fight for or against.

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