Marin Forum

Two weeks after Iran’s tumultuous elections it’s now clear that whatever political conflict has emerged in Iran will not be resolved any time soon. Rather, the nature and direction of change in the Islamic Republic will remain obscure, and whatever resolution this conflict may have will only be found in a protracted process. Whether civil unrest will continue to foment and mature like it did in Iran’s 1979 Revolution or whether a political solution by the establishment can be had remains to be seen. Iran’s social unrest has certainly derailed Obama’s diplomatic efforts to engage Iran on the nuclear issue, but the likely paths Iran’s social unrest could take may also provide new diplomatic opportunities for the US moderate Iranian politics. Because directly meddling in Iran’s domestic politics is out of the question, just how much pressure the US can assert over Iran will largely hinge on what approach Iran’s political establishments will now take.

There is little the US can do if Iran’s government continues to crack down on political dissenters and maintain a conservative hardline. However, that possibility threatens the internal legitimacy and political stability of Iran and would more likely lead to an overthrow of the political system like in 1979. On the other hand if crackdowns do little to quail the civil unrest the Iranian establishment may become more moderate on its own in self preservation. Changing the political structure or removing from power hardline conservatives that have become the target of the protests could end political dissent and preserve Iran’s political institutions. This solution largely depends on whether the opposition can organize and find support within the political establishment and Iran’s military to overrule Supreme Leader Khamenei. However, such a process has no guarantee of working, and could stymie or become subject to crackdowns and purges.

The Iranian establishment could also attempt to quiet protestors and consolidate its political legitimacy by looking outside instead of inside its own country. It is this solution which could give the US some sway over Iran. This approach could come in two forms. The more direct and simpler form would be if the Iranian government tries to push for international recognition as a source of legitimacy. Although such a push may provide few diplomatic openings for the US at first, if Iran’s internal unrest worsens it could elevate the value of such a gesture to the Iranian government. Even so, the influence and effectiveness of such a gesture remains a long shot at best. More substantively, Iran’s government could seek to consolidate its political legitimacy by reintegrating itself to the world economy. Such an attempt would seek to co opt the opposition by appeasing their positions on Iranian policy held during the election. However, this solution would also require Iran’s government to make concessions to western powers that it may be unwilling to carry out—including concessions over its nuclear program—which also makes this possibility a long shot.

Any potential for US diplomatic engagement with Iran will rely on how desperate the Iranian government is to maintain its power in a potential political overthrow by opposition forces (should they persist). The key to any chance for the US to draw out concessions from Iran’s current government in the future will depend on the state of Iran’s internal stability and its willingness to seek political survival over its desire to preserve a political hardline. So long as Iran’s political establishment exhibits the desire to survive at any cost, the US will have the opportunity diplomatically squeeze Iran in an uncomfortable double bind that forces it to choose between a gamble with an increasingly discontent society and a compromise of its hardline policy. Of course, successful silencing of dissent is just as likely an outcome and would lead to a more extreme Iran which would prove even more difficult to engage with. In any case, Iran’s political circumstances have fundamentally changed, forcing the Obama to reassess his Iran policy. Nonetheless, just as it has ruined old opportunities, such a change may provide new ones.

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