Marin Forum

I wrote the following in October 2009 after the DPJ came to power. I think it is fitting to publish this work now that Hatoyama has resigned and the DPJ has struggled to govern.

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In one election fifty four years of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule in Japan ended. To many Japanese the fall of the LDP was a shock, yet there was a certain inevitability to the ousting of the LDP by the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) this August. The LDP experienced a gradual erosion of efficiency and legitimacy. More importantly is that the factors at stake are not unique to the Japanese system but can undermine any sitting government.

Several factors contributed to the fall of the LDP. Japanese politics following the post-war years faced a series of “shocks to the system.” Japan experienced several economic crises beginning with the oil shock of 1973 to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Economic difficulties made it harder for the LDP to keep its promise of sustained economic growth. During this same time period the LDP faced a series of high profile corruption scandals involving high ranking officials. These events coupled together hurt the integrity of the LDP.

In the 1990s Japan introduced several electoral reforms. Japan moved toward single-member districts which favor a two party system. Electoral contests focused more on competition between parties than competition amongst individuals. The DPJ, as the second largest party in Japan, had the most to gain from these reforms. From 1996 to 2004 the DPJ gained over 100 seats in the Lower House. Furthermore, electoral reform caused a split in the LDP and the emergence of several small parties. As a result the LDP has typically been forced to enter into coalition governments with the breakaway factions. By the 2000s the LDP no longer had a monopoly on power.

Berkeley political science professor Darren Zook argues that the LDP’s loss of a power is a direct result of its loss of legitimacy due to inefficiency. According to Zook, since Junichiro Koizumi was Prime Minister the government has been completely inept (at least in the eyes of the Japanese electorate). Under this argument electoral reform, economic trends, and corruption play a secondary role. The LDP has long been corrupt even when it was firmly in power. Likewise, the LDP held onto power several decades after the economy began to slump. Lastly, even after electoral reforms the LDP roughly maintained their share of the Lower House and had a landslide victory in 2005.

Inefficiency is essentially the culmination of all the previous factors. Corruption increases transaction costs which results in inefficiency. An inefficient government is unable to properly respond to economic and political crises; thus, it becomes inept from the perspective of the electorate and loses legitimacy. At this point, regime change becomes possible.

What happened to the LDP in Japan was not unique: the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico faced a similar fate in 2000. Like the LDP, the PRI was extremely corrupt but had brought economic growth and political stability. However, by the 1990s the PRI was viewed by the electorate as unable to address Mexico’s problems. The PRI leadership struggled in the wake of natural disasters in the 1980s, the economic crises of the 1980s that afflicted all of Latin America, and increasing political violence and assassinations in the early 1990s. Thus, the much of the electorate saw them as inept and voted for the opposition in the 2000 presidential elections.

Singapore and the People’s Action Party (PAP) provide another example of the importance of efficiency. The PAP, which has ruled Singapore since its independence in 1963, is extremely efficient. Professor Zook suggests that there is no corruption and the government has expertly managed the economy even through global downturns. Zook further argues that today there is no chance that the PAP could fall from power. However, he pointed out that a move toward a multi-party system is not out of the question. One claim that one-party rule is inefficient since it suppresses innovative ideas that can help Singapore remain competitive in the global economy is gaining traction in Singapore. But as long as the system remains efficient and competitive the PAP will be securely in power.

The cases of Mexico and Singapore show that the events bringing down the LDP were not unique to Japanese politics nor were they unpredictable. The difficulty is pinpointing the exact moment when the ruling party becomes completely inefficient to the point where it loses all legitimacy. The key lesson is that inefficiency and its effects are not confined to one-party governments but affect any ruling regime from kleptocracies in Africa to liberal democracies in the heart of Europe.

As for Japan’s near future, the country is at a crossroads. On one side there is a sense of hope and excitement. For the first time in over fifty years the people can shape Japanese politics in a fundamentally new direction. On the other side there is anxiety and fear that the DPJ will be no better than the LDP. Already in Mexico the PRI has mounted a strong comeback after the summer 2009 midterm elections and are the front-runners for the 2012 presidential elections. Likewise, the LDP could reorganize itself in opposition and come back to power if the DPJ falters. The DPJ would be best to recognize that the factors that brought down the LDP could easily stymie the new DPJ government.