Marin Forum

The legacy of the Cold War brings thoughts of failed East European states and societies torn apart by the proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union but the most pertinent legacy is emerging in the domestic sphere. If the Great Depression and World War II created the Greatest Generation then the Cold War may have developed the “failed generation.”

The United States (and the world for that matter) has changed in numerous ways since the 1950s and 1960s as this generation was growing up. Economically, the United States was the undisputed powerhouse. Every industrialized nation from France and Germany to Japan was devastated by the war and was just beginning to fully recover by the 1960s. As a result the United States exported and provided credit; jobs were plentiful. Politically, President Eisenhower brought stability and prosperity while President Kennedy delivered inspiration and further economic growth. In national security, the world was black and white. Even though there was the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust, the enemy was always the tyrannical Soviet Union. Socially, the United States was still a white nation. Hispanic immigration had yet to change the demographic balance in the American Southwest.

Then things began to change beginning in the 1970s. Vietnam became a disaster that destroyed the Johnson Presidency. President Nixon only escalated the war until he was undone by Watergate. The “crisis in government” that began with the break-in at the Watergate Hotel continued to fester under the ineffectiveness of the Carter Administration. Economically, the United States was weakening vis-à-vis other industrialized nations. The Bretton Woods order collapsed in 1971 and the oil shocks further weakened the economic system. The 1980s ushered in the chaotic phenomenon of globalization. By the 1980s Americans had lost confidence in government and the economy.

In the 1990s and 2000s the Cold War Generation found themselves in an alien world. The Soviet Union was gone and instead threats came from obscure parts of the world such as Kosovo, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Globalization wrecked the American psyche. Jobs went overseas and consumer goods that were once produced in the industrial heartlands of America were stamped with “made in China.” 9/11 forced average Americans into contact with the “bizarre” culture of the Muslim world. Hispanic immigration expanded away from the border regions. Immigrant communities could be found in every state. Meanwhile demographic changes in California made Whites a majority-minority with a similar trend predicted in Texas by 2025 and eventually in the rest of the United States.

Today’s reactionary movements are the legacy of the Cold War. The demographic makeup of the Tea Party and associated groups are predominately white, middle-aged Americans – the Cold War Generation. They are reactionary because they have not been able to adapt to the realities of a globalized and multipolar world.

Economics. The 1950s and 1960s were a high point for the American middle class and manufacturing. Naturally the Cold War Generation expected to inherit the prosperity in which they were raised. But globalization radically changed reality and this generation was the first to face the ravages of globalization. Globalization and neo-liberal policies reduced the role of the state in guaranteeing economic prosperity as economic power shifted to the private sector. However government regulatory powers did not accompany the greater role of individual private sector actors. President Reagan pushed deregulation and emphasized the need for less government just as the Cold War Generation was entering the workforce or entering the middle of their careers. By the 1990s this generation made up the majority of the workforce and management making any effort to push regulation a dead end. The second change was the end of manufacturing and the destruction of blue-collar America. The Cold War Generation expected to make a living in the steel mills and auto factories. Globalization has gradually eroded the viability of these industries as the manufacturing centers of the United States, such as Detroit, become ghost towns. The jobs they expected are simply not there. Their anger was easily co-opted by conservatives who blamed their problems on government through NAFTA, taxation, “excessive” regulation, and the Wall Street elite who benefited from globalization (the members of the Cold War Generation who were able to adapt). The reactionary right wants to return to the economic expansion of the 1950s.

Political discourse. Events during the Cold War were portrayed as black and white issues – democracy vs. totalitarianism and capitalism vs. communism. Anything that undermined the American way of life (democracy and capitalism) was either labeled as fascist or communist since these were the two great enemies of the western world in the twentieth century. After the fall of the Berlin Wall communism disappeared and fascism had been gone for a half century, but the Cold War Generation still only knew how to classify the world in these terms. It had not adapted to the new realities of a multipolar world. Thus, President Obama is labeled a communist or a fascist because they do not know any other way to describe someone or something that departs from the status quo.

On a range of issues the Cold War Generation continues to show its inability or refusal to adapt. The demographics of the country are changing and there is no reversal. The Cold War Generation feels powerless to confront the issue and have turned to anger. Likewise, climate change is essentially a referendum on their lifestyle. They refuse to accept that the things their generation developed and worked for is now negatively impacting the environment.

The post-Cold War world is not what the Cold War Generation expected. With the defeat of the Soviet Union they expected greater freedom and prosperity. Instead they have found the economy falling apart and governments telling them that certain actions are unacceptable. FOX News or MSNBC provides them the information that they want to hear not the information that they need to hear. The world has changed and they are not prepared for it. They have turned to reactionaries as they seek to turn back the clock to a world they remember when growing up. When individuals are unable to keep up with changes they seek to return to a previous time instead of attempting to adapt and change. They also turn inward for introspection. As a result the Cold War Generation has provided a very literal interpretation of the Constitution and a re-write of the founding history of the country that conforms to their reactionary views.

Conservatism is not a problem but reactionary forces do pose a serious problem. Unfortunately just as the Cold War Generation is inheriting the positions of influence it is also turning to reactionary impulses. An attempt to turn back the clock will be a disaster for this country. There is no future in the past nor can the new realities of the world be ignored much longer. The Cold War Generation is on the verge of becoming the “failed generation” as it squanders the economic and political capital of the United States due to its inability to adapt and respond to the post Cold War world. If the Cold War Generation is spent then what is the future of the Post-Cold War Generation and how would it respond to a reactionary shift?

The modern human rights movements finally gained momentum in the 1970s and since then people have been seeking ways to pressure governments. In cases of state led genocide or systematic human rights violations people have turned to disinvestment or “divestment.” However, in the end of the day divestment is simply economic sanctions without teeth. In other words: ineffective. Divestment had some effect in South Africa but was not the death knell to Apartheid, it was completely ineffective in Sudan, and it is a waste of time in Israel.

Geopolitics, not divestment and humanitarian concerns, toppled the National Party and Apartheid in South Africa. The date of the end of Apartheid as official policy is significant – 1990 when President De Klerk announced that he would repeal the discriminatory laws. Five thousand miles away, the Berlin Wall fell four months earlier.

South Africa was the site of one of the many proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States supported the white National Party while the Soviet Union supported the ANC and many of South Africa’s antagonistic neighbors. As long as the Soviets maintained an influence in South Africa the United States government would continue supporting the National Party and Apartheid, since pressuring the South African government on Apartheid would potentially endanger a “vital partnership” in the fight against Communism. In 1990 the Soviets were gone and South Africa lost any strategic importance to the United States. With no more support from the United States, isolation from the international community, and continued domestic unrest from the ANC and other anti-Apartheid groups (after-all these were legitimate opposition groups and not Soviet pawns) the South African government had no choice but to end Apartheid.

Divestment did not have an effect until after the Berlin Wall fell. By this time divestment was backed by State support. Unlike other attempts at divestment, the anti-Apartheid movement gained national support in the US Congress and Senate which passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. President Reagan opposed the act (he even vetoed it although it was overridden) and did not seriously enforce it. As a result trade actually increased between South Africa and the United States between 1988 and 1998. By 1990 divestment had morphed into economic sanctions that were enforced by the state actors.

Divestment did nothing to stop genocide in Darfur. Initially the Bush Administration was hesitant call the conflict in Darfur genocide since the Government of Sudan had a role to play in the War on Terror. Furthermore, by the time the Save Darfur Coalition had raised enough international awareness the conflict had changed from genocide to civil war and civil unrest. As many observers predicted the conflict wore itself out although there is still no resolution to the violence.

The divestment that did occur had little to no effect on Sudan. In fact Sudan’s GDP grew 10% in 2006 and 2007. The difference between South Africa in 1990 and Sudan in the 2000 was globalization. For every “western” firm that pulled out of Sudan, a Chinese or Indian firm took its place. Under Clinton the United States imposed sanctions on Sudan due to its connections to international terrorism and human rights abuses in Southern Sudan. The US oil firms were forced to leave, but they were quickly replaced by the Chinese who now play a large role in the Sudanese economy. Due to this new dynamic, the United States is forced to negotiate with Russia and China to develop any credible international sanctions. If unilateral economic sanctions are no longer enough to force policy change then how can divestment that has no enforcement mechanism possibly be effective?

It is for these reasons that divestment cannot possibly work in Israel. Economically, divestment has some potential for success. Israel has very little friends outside Europe and the United States. China would be hesitant to invest in Israel because it would jeopardize its crucial investments and contracts in Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, in today’s globalized world it is more than likely that a budding firm from an emerging market would set up shop in Israel to make a quick buck in the absence of the large multinational firms. The problem with divestment in Israel is political. Like in South Africa, divestment will be ineffective as long as the US government supports the Israeli government. And the US is not going to be withdrawing its support from Israel anytime soon.

Israel has something that neither the Apartheid government or the Sudanese government had: AIPAC, the most powerful lobbying group in the country. South Africa or Sudan never had a strong lobbying in the US to argue on its behalf. Every major politician listens to AIPAC and seeks their endorsement. Immediately after Vice President Biden’s disastrous trip to Israel, Secretary of State Clinton was quick to speak before AIPAC on the importance of the US-Israel relationship. Effective divestment in Israel would require one of the government largest policy changes in history.

Divestment in Israel poses one last problem. The Israel-Palestine conflict is a security dilemma. Israel will not go to the negotiating table until it is certain that its borders and existence are secured. Palestine will not go to the table until Israel settlements and abuses stop. A divestment campaign that is aimed at targeted Israel’s ability to acquire defense weaponry will make Israel feel less secure. Meanwhile mortars and rockets will continue to enter Palestine. Divestment will not push Israel to the negotiating table.

Unfortunately, divestment is nothing more than a symbolic act that has very little effect on policy while hurting US businesses. American and European companies divested from Sudan and the Sudanese government found less squeamish firms and continued its genocidal policies. In South Africa divestment only had an effect once the United States was no longer willing to support the National Party. Divestment was then backed by political action but then this is no longer divestment but an economic sanction. Thus, in Israel divestment will never work until it is backed by political support from the United States government (essentially the US government placing sanctions on Israel).

In the last three decades there have been many attempts to democratize foreign policy. However, this immediately comes into conflict with an international system that only recognizes nation states as sovereign actors. People can divest and they can protest but in the end of the day the power to change foreign policy rests in the hands of the national foreign policy establishments.

Why is NATO strong? Powerful economies, United States hegemony, and sophisticated weaponry all play a role in answering this question, but perhaps the most crucial answer is identity. A superpower can force a security organization into existence like the Warsaw Pact and economies can band together to defend their interests like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) but they need something more to sustain them. Formal institutions are important for sustainability but they do not explain how and why these organization are formed in the first place. Why does a nation enter into a security organization in the first place?

The obvious first answer is the presence of an external threat. But in order for that threat to be recognized there needs to be a “collective consciousness” or identity that identifies the threat as a threat. Let’s take the example of NATO. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the Western powers in response to potential aggression from the Soviet Union. And it was a defense pact for the idea of liberal democracy. Thus, identity has both an external and internal component. Externally it creates an “us” and “them” distinction; while internally it is a set of common values. A security organization arises when there is an external threat to a set of communal values that are worth protecting. Hence, the strength of the security organization will depend on the strength of the identity formation.

For example, the Warsaw Pact was never as strong as NATO despite far superior conventional forces because its internal identity was formed by Soviet hegemony. Communism was a foreign institution for the Eastern bloc whereas liberal democracy developed naturally in the NATO members. The Warsaw Pact quickly fell apart when the external identity dimension – the threat of Western military aggression – disappeared and the internal dimension – Communism supported by Soviet hegemony – dissolved.

Identity is a social construct so it can take an almost limitless number of forms. In security organizations one of the most common is an identity based on geography. NATO was the north Atlantic region (itself a social construct – prior to the twentieth century there was no concept of the North Atlantic region ) and later included all of Europe. SEATO was Southeast Asia (likewise Southeast Asia did not exist as a concept until after decolonization and has only recently been articulated as an identity). Religion has been another way to form an identity. Islamic countries formed the Organization of the Islamic Conference to safeguard their interests (although this is not a security organization). Race has been another common identity formation. The colonial powers entered into alliances with local tribes that appeared more Caucasian or “western.” Likewise, memos from the US State Department show officials hesitant to form alliances with “inferior Asiatic races.” A common history is a further source of identity formation. European nations entered alliances with their former colonies and the United States entered SEATO with the Philippines citing the common struggle against the Japanese. Lastly, identity can form around ideology or world view. The cornerstone of NATO is the protection of the liberal democratic world order. The League of Nations or the United Nations were formed on the liberal notions of world order. No particular identity construction is stronger than another since a certain construction will only become salient under certain conditions. In the United Nations, a multicultural organization, race plays little role in identity formation while ideology, the commitment to the UN Charter (a liberal document), is the key identity construct.

A security organization’s strength is related to the number of identity constructs present. NATO is strong because the geographic, racial, religious, historical, and ideological constructs are all present. The presence of numerous constructs allows the organization to emphasis or de-emphasis certain constructs based on the situation. Had NATO  been solely a religious organization (Christian-secular) it would have been very difficult  to incorporate Turkey (Islamic-secular). Instead NATO emphasized its  historical and ideological constructs (along with the external threat dimension) and as a result Turkey provides the second largest standing army in the NATO alliance. The presence of more constructs makes the organization more stable since when a certain construct becomes a volatile issue the organization can quickly shift its identity to a different construct.

The relationship between the internal and external formation of identity is vital for the strength of the organization. Just as the organization can shift its internal identity among its shared identity constructs, the organization can shift its emphasis between its internal and external identity formations. In the case of Turkey the threat of communism and the Soviet Union provided further reason to join NATO in the absence of shared internal identity constructs. Following the end of the Cold War NATO shifted its focus toward its internal identity formation in order to keep the alliance relevant as it lacked an external identity dimension. When both dimensions of identity are present the organization is strong as NATO was during the Cold War; if one dimension disappears than the organization will weaken over the long term.

Today commentators say that NATO is facing an “identity crisis.” And they are right because NATO has lost its external identity and could face an erosion of its internal identity. The threat is no longer coming from the Soviet Union or communism. The United States has tried to frame the threat as Islamic fundamentalism but not all NATO members view this threat on the same level as they did with communism. NATO enters the twenty-first century without a strong external identity dimension. Even internally NATO is showing some cracks. Eastward expansion threatens to undermine its internal identity. Liberal democracies with market economies in the North Atlantic region (and later nearly seamlessly expanded to the European continent) form NATO’s internal identity. Does the inclusion of Georgia in NATO undermine its liberal democracy identity? Historically not all members of NATO were liberal democracies, but in today’s NATO Portugal, Spain, and Greece are democracies and Turkey is democratizing. Clearly the inclusion of Israel or Iraq (as some have suggested) would undermine its geographic identity. Thus, NATO’s problems are not caused by weakening institutions, transatlantic bickering, or the decline of the United States’ unipolar moment, but the erosion of the elements that formed NATO’s identity.

What are the implications for a European Union defense organization? At the moment the outlook is bleak. Externally, an EU Security Organization faces the same dilemma as NATO. There is no clear external threat to the EU especially since terrorism is not as big of a focus for Europeans as it is for the United States. Internally, there is no agreement on what constitutes a European identity or if it even exists. There is an elite identity for Europe that has been at the heart of European integration (an economically prosperous and peaceful Europe that is a beacon for democratic values, international law, and human rights) but it remains just that – a viewpoint held by Eurocrats in Brussels. There is nothing to stand up against nor anything to protect. Thus, a EU security organization is not possible until there is an external tangible and serious threat to the EU or a common salient European identity.

Identity tells us what to cherish and who are our enemies. Without identity there is no reason to form a security organization because there is nothing to fight for or against.