Marin Forum

Earlier this week Russian President Medvedev gave a speech that many interpreted as a rebuke of the Putin the years. Medvedev stressed the need for economic reform, a pragmatic foreign policy, and the importance of tackling corruption. He specifically stated that the effectiveness of Russian foreign policy “should be judged by a single criterion: Does it contribute to improving living standards in our country?” This is in sharp contrast to Putin’s post-2004 foreign policy that has sought to reassert Russian authority through various blusters. But was this actually an attack on the man who is essentially President Medvedev’s patron?

It is no secret that Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin do not get along. In fact they are rarely seen together in public. The Financial Times likes to point out every assertive statement made by Medevdev while the US press has been far more reserved in suggesting that Medvedev is able to act independently of Mr. Putin.

It just seems improbable that Medvedev would so openly challenge is “patron.” Putin brought Medvedev into government from the private sector. Then in 2005 Putin appointed Medvedev to the post of First Deputy Prime Minister. From there he was chosen to succeed Putin for the presidency. Putin would not have named a successor that couldn’t count on to be a “yes man.” Medvedev may be the face of the Russian state, but Putin is the one with all the power. Furthermore, challenging Putin’s power would seem to be ludicrous since Putin has firmly established the loyalty of the Russian political and economic elite (often by “appointing” former KGB buddies to the major industrial corporations).

Under this this reasoning Medvedev and Putin are playing a good cop-bad cop act. When the Russian state needs to take a softer and more conciliatory stance Mr. Medvedev is on the forefront, and when a tough approach is necessary Mr. Putin is not far away. A much more mild US example would be the Eisenhower-Nixon administration.

But could a split be genuine? Medvedev seemed to have taken a much too independent stance on WTO accession before Putin pulled Russia’s membership bid (humiliating Medvedev in the process). A few months ago Medvedev announced that he would consider running for the presidency again in 2012 stressing that he had his own popularity. Then on Thursday he gave a 140 minute “state of the nation” speech that seeks a new trajectory for Russia. And so the United States and Europe are perplexed.

Yet it was only slightly over twenty years ago that another Russian politician sought a bold trajectory. At first Western leaders were unsure what to make of the loyal Communist Gorbachev. Quickly, Gorbachev made good on his word. Could the loyal Putinist (perhaps formerly) be heading in the same direction?

Actions need to speak for these words before any pronouncement can be made, but US policy towards Russia needs to recognize this possibility. The US would much rather see Mr. Medvedev in office come 2012 than Mr. Putin. For starters the Obama administration needs to make efforts to engage with Medvedev. President Reagan helped end the Cold War when he reached out to Gorbachev. In response, Gorbachev found legitimacy in the international community. Western enthusiasm and support proved critical to Gorbachev. Likewise, Medvedev may not have the support of parts of the Russian oligarchy, international support may provide the necessary legitimacy to keep him afloat.

How does Obama reach out to Medvedev? On this issue Obama should take a lesson from Reagan. In fact Obama is already in the process of doing so through nuclear non-proliferation. Reagan’s strong commitment to preventing nuclear war by reducing nuclear armaments greatly impressed Gorbachev. Through arms limitation talks the two leaders were able to develop a rapport that was extremely influential in bringing about the end of the Cold War. Like Reagan, Obama is committed to a nuclear free world. The centerpiece of restarting relations with Russia has been a new nuclear weapons treaty. The administration certainly hopes that Obama and Medvedev can establish a rapport through nuclear disamament talks.  Furthermore, if Medvedev is truly a moderate liberal pragmatic then there should be elements of Obama’s world vision based on international law and cooperation that appeal to him. If the two trained lawyers can develop a relationship then Mr. Medvedev may find the international legitimacy to sustain a more independent course of action.

There is still reason to engage with Mr. Medvedev even if he does turn out to be completely loyal to Putin. Medvedev and Putin represent two faces of Russian foreign policy. If concrete results can be achieved through the Medvedev approach (cooperation) then Putin and the Russian state will turn towards that path. The hardline approach in Russian policy in part has been a reaction to the unilateral policies of the Bush years. Cooperation and openness with the Russian state in turn encourages the Russian state to cooperate with the international community.

Regardless if there is a split between the two Russian leaders or not, US policy toward Russia needs to focus on engagement and cooperation. The key is trust. Mr. Putin embodies the sense of distrust many Russians feel toward the United States and Western Europe. Likewise, Mr. Medvedev needs to know that he can trust the international community. The international community in turn needs to give him the opportunities and space to operate independently. This means no interference in Russian internal affairs or overt support for any candidate. Medvedev is not going to act independently if the international community just throws him under bus.

It has long been the position of this blog to support the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan (although we may have strongly criticized the strategies). We recognized from the beginning that the Surge in Iraq was the right strategy to set the conditions for an exit strategy and a “stable” Iraq. Likewise, we saw President’s Obama’s promise to step up our efforts in Afghanistan as the right decision. Afghanistan was where all the problems began. However, recent events have shown that Afghanistan is quickly becoming a lost cause.

However, the war effort is not a lost cause for the reasons commonly asserted by the Left. Afghanistan has a history of destroying empires. The historical argument is compelling. After all, efforts by the superpowers to unite the country all ended in humiliation. But, historical determinism theory is usually discredited by historians. It ignores the influence of individuals and events. The Soviet Union was not popular in Afghanistan but their ultimate defeat in the region was due to foreign influence. In 2002 the United States had popular support and things may well have been different with proper leadership. The Afghan people do not want nor do they believe in democracy. This argument is essentially an extension of the bigoted thesis proposed in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Islam and democracy are not incompatible. The Afghan people have little experience with democracy and it is limited to the current democracy under Karzai’s government. Hence, to the Afghan people democracy (as envisioned by the United States) is just more ineffective government. The people aren’t opposed to democracy, they are opposed to corrupt and ineffective government.

The Taliban has become more bold in their attacks as security continues to deteriorate in the country. Our international partners have been hesitant to commit troops and resources and it’s likely that many will begin to pull out their troops in the next year. But more importantly, after eight years the Afghan government still has no legitimacy. The recent elections were clearly fraudulent. Today, President Karzai’s main rival, Abdullah Abdullah, has decided to withdraw from runoff election citing persistent problems of fraud. Thus, the results of any runoff will be seen as illegitimate.

The success to any state building effort must have support from 1) an engaged “lead” state along with the international community and 2) strong and legitimate local rulers. The United States is unquestionably engaged in Afghanistan and is committed to its stability. The problem is that the second criteria does not exist. Karzai may have had enough legitimacy in the beginning of the conflict but he subsequently lost it all. Afghan leaders who have legitimacy remain outside the government because they do not want to be associated with the inept and corrupt Karzai government.

The United States has three options:

1. Afghanization. This strategy consists of accepting the current political situation while making efforts to strengthen the Afghan institutions. Militarily, this strategy involves a gradual troop buildup (20,000-40,000 troops). The problem is that 40,000 more troops makes little difference. Perhaps if the Afghan government had legitimacy a limited troop increase would be helpful. Otherwise, a modest increase in troops will only provide limited security benefits while endorsing the current political situation.
2. Militarization. To provide security to the entire country would probably require a buildup of 100,000+ troops. This would be the exact opposite of Afghanization. Since the NATO allies are unlikely to contribute much the bulk of the buildup would have to come from the United States. This option would put operation of the country more in the hands of the United States; thus, potentially allowing the United States to reshape and strengthen Afghanistan’s political institutions. Such an option is completely impractical. Back in the United States the public couldn’t stomach such a large buildup. The United States doesn’t have the military resources for a sustained, large military buildup. Nor would the United States be seen to be any more legitimate than the current Afghan government.
3. Withdraw. An exit strategy was supposed to look like this: troop increases would allow the Afghan government to strengthen its position. Elections would then yield to the United States handing authority over to the Afghans. Security didn’t improve and the elections were a complete failure. Under ideal circumstances the US would be able to withdraw while leaving a small contingent of troops to provide military training and counterinsurgency operations. But without strong US backing the Afghan government will fall like a house of cards. It has no legitimacy, it is facing a well organized insurgency, and its military is a paper army. Downplaying our role in Afghanistan is complete withdrawal.

Afghanization is the status quo which is unacceptable. Militarization is impractical. Withdrawal is the only option short of reshuffling the Afghan government (is that practical?). But is there someone more effective than Karzai? Politically we are failing in Afghanistan and it is becoming ever harder to reverse eight years of ineffective governance.

Withdrawal will not be pretty. Essentially its a confirmation that the last eight years have been a failure and a waste of resources and lives. It will probably parallel the US evacuation of Vietnam in 1975. It will be demoralizing. Also it will have long term repercussions. NATO may very well lose its relevance. If it can’t handle “out of area” operations then what distinguishes it from the budding defense arrangements under the EU’s Common Security and Foreign Policy? More importantly, Afghanistan will be a failed state which will require the international community’s constant attention. Somalia is a headache for the international community; yet, had it been committed to Somalia’s stability in the early 1990s piracy may very well not be the problem that it is today.  Lastly there is the problem of Pakistan. An unstable Afghanistan may very well bring down the Pakistani government. The US withdraw from Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan state will haunt the US and the international community for years to come.

Yet, these are the effects that the US will have to stomach. Getting out of Afghanistan will free up resources and political capital for Obama’s domestic agenda and his other international efforts. It will change the US-Europe relationship for the better. Instead of focusing efforts on bolstering NATO efforts in a losing effort, Obama and European leaders can turn their efforts toward climate change and nuclear nonproliferation. It is important that the US does not ignore the region like it did in the 1990s. This is where Obama’s diplomatic effort will be critical. The US will need the support of Pakistan, Russia, China, and even Iran to “contain” Afghanistan.

It’s time to get out of Afghanistan. Our efforts in Afghanistan cannot succeed without a legitimate Afghan government. Afghanistan is limiting our foreign policy and is diverting resources and capital from our domestic policy.