Marin Forum

In the last few days two stories came to attention: the cancellation of the F-22 program and the statistic that July has been the bloodiest month for coalition forces in Afghanistan since the war began. On the surface these appear to be completely unrelated events. The F-22 has not been assigned to Afghanistan and the recent “surge” in Helmand Province is predominately a ground operation. Where is the connection? It is operations like Operation Khanjar or the surge in Iraq that show why the F-22 is a wasted asset.

In the last two decades military strategy has increasingly shifted toward the use of airpower. One of the stories of the Cold War was the rise of the Air Force as the pre-eminent military branch. World War II showed the significance and importance of airpower. The Allies recognized the destructiveness of airpower and its ability to demoralize the enemy. Thus, in the early years of the Cold War, Air Force generals like Curtis LeMay became prominant in the Pentagon. Until the development of ICBMs the nuclear startegy of the United States relied on bombers as the delivery vehicle (in fact throughout the Cold War, the United States was far more reliant on a nuclear bomber fleet than the Soviet Union). In the Cuban Missile Crisis, LeMay was a strong advocate of bombing military installations in Cuba. The Vietnam War was effectively the culmination of the past twenty years of airpower thinking especially the final bombing operations of the war such as Operation Lineback II.

The 1990s saw a further progression of airpower strategy as it became the centerpiece of US operations. The military apparatus was impressed by the Air Force’s performace in the first Gulf War. Not only did US warplanes dominate Iraqi airspace but the war saw the first use of percision weapons and stealth planes (the F-117 Nighthawk). Bosnia gave the Air Force even more confidence. The common interpretation is that US airpower and use of cruise missiles forced Slobodan Milošević to the peace table. Likewise, in the 1999 Kosovo War many argue that airpower alone defeated Milošević.

Why has the airforce become dominate?

1. It has had some very prominant successes. The Air Force has shown that it can be extremely effective at what it does. The quick ends to the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Bosnia (once NATO began bombing) lend support to this claim. Futhermore, the US Air Force is one of the best equiped air forces in the world. Even the US’s fleet of 30 year old front line fighters are equal or better than any opposing force (although the new Chinese J-10 is most likely superior). Results earn respect; the US Air Force has earned its respect.
2. The air force has become extremely good at procuring new weapons systems. Many of the top research projects in the US military are being developed by the air force. Furthermore, the air force and its contractors have learned to spread their operations around the US. A new airbase not only provided a strategic value but it also provided an economc boost to local communities. The same is true for the military contractors such as Lockheed Martin. The F-22 had considerable support in Congress because various parts of the plane were produced in many members’ districts and were a source of emloyment. The air force knows how to play politics.
3. Finally, Americans do not have the guts for war. Clinton was especially fearful of military casualities. The US quickly pulled out of Somolia after 19 soldiers died over a period of five months. In Kosovo, Clinton refused to send US soldiers because he feared the domestic political backlash. Similar sentiments are held by Europeans which has hampered operations in Afghanistan. As a result political and military leaders have sought “low cost” operations that keep US personnel out of harms way.

This “low cost” strategy essentially relies on the ability for the military to conduct quick and devestateing airstrikes. Technology wise the emphasis is placed on aircraft with long range, high speed, and stealth capabilities. Excluding the revamped versions of the F-16 and F/A-18, all combat aircraft that entered production in the last twenty years have met these criteria (F-117, B-2, F-22, and soon the F-35). These aircraft are perfect for penetrating enemy airspace and bombing, lets say a nuclear reactor, without being detected. Meanwhile, the F-22 can engage with any fighter deployed Russia or China. The problem arises when there are no high priority targets or aerial conflicts with China/Russia.

Thus, we get to the connection with Operation Khanjar. In 2001 the US Air Force ran into a problem in Afghanistan. There were no high priority targets to bomb. It was said “how can we bomb a country into the stone age when it is already in the stone age.” Strategy developed during the 1990s called for the Air Force to target key infrastructure  (including civilian) and military assets. By crippling infrastructure and communications the enemy would fold. The Air Force was tired of targeting tanks and other field equipment as was common in the Gulf War and the Bosnian War. However, Afghanistan did not have the infrastructure, and the Taliban was able to operate without it. In 2003 Saddam’s army was easily routed but the high tech airforce was completely incapable of eliminating the resulting insurgency. Then in 2006 the Isreali air bombardments during the 2006 Lebanon War failed to achieve any of Isreal’s objectives.

Even the so called “successes” of airpower, Bosnia and Kosovo, were less successful then they are portaryed to be. In both Bosnia and Kosovo airpower was believed to be the decisive factor. Upon closer examination this claim falls apart. In Bosnia, Milošević capitulated because the Croatian army was making rapid gains. Yes, Milošević was rather shocked by NATO firepower and that certainly played a role but the deciding factors were the conditions on the ground. In Kosovo other factors explain why Milošević surrendered. It finally appeared that President Clinton was committed to sending ground troops and NATO promised to deploy 50,000 troops. Perhaps more importantly, Moscow refused to give crucial support to Belgrade. Milošević was out of oppotions and saw surrender as the only way to maintain his regime. However, another lesson can be learned from Kosovo. The NATO bombings of Belgrade created significant negative opinion toward the West among Serbs. Timothy Garton Ash argues that the NATO bombings completely undermined the student demonstrations against  Milošević that were present before the war. Futhermore, the intial NATO bombings encouraged Serbs to commit more “ethnic cleansing” (although proponents of the air war argue that had NATO been more aggressive initially the reciprocated killings could have been prevented). Air power alone does not seem to be the end all solution.

The 2006 “Surge” in Iraq showed a new approach to military strategy. Greater emphasis would be placed on ground forces securing the area and embedding with the local population. Likewise, now in Afghanistan we are seeing a new “surge.” The occupation of a country greatly dimenishes the necessity for stealth, and the low tech nature of the Taliban makes the advanced electronics of the new generation of aircraft useless. The 50 year old B-52 is just as effective and more reliable than the stealthy  B-2. Meanwhile, the F-16s and F/A-18s are perfectly capable of performing the strike capabilities that were supposed to be carried out by the F-22 and F-35. Thus, we find ourselves with a weapon that has no practical battlefield use.

The F-22 was designed to counter any fighter produced by Russia or China. Since a conflict with Russia or China are effectively out of the question, the only potential threat is from high tech Russian or Chinese weaponry that are purchased on the market by a developing nation. Venezuela and Iran have purchased Su-30s, and there are reports that Terhan attempted to buy some Chinese J-10s. These fighters may be a threat but they are in such small quantities that the current fleet of F-22s (capped at 187) would be more than enough to effectively deal with it. Otherwise most developing world airforces predominately consist of Vietnam-era Russian and Chinese fighters. The Taliban’s ”air forice” was a joke. The F-15 could easily achieve air-superiority.

As Bosnia, Kosovo, and the 2006 Iraq Surge show the ground war is the vital factor. Thus, the air force should be built around a supportive role for our ground forces instead of a first-strike orientation. Stealth planes will not be important and will be underutilized in the future foreseable conflicts. This is not to say that first-strike capable aircraft are useless. These aircraft can be vital for eliminating key ground defense positions and anti-aircraft batteries. However, to convert the entire fleet to extremely expensive high-tech aircraft is a mistake. Once boots hit the ground the element of surprise is lost. Instead the military should focus on upgrading the current fleet of F-15s/F-16s/F-18s and potentially consider the  development of a fighter with the performance of the F-22 minues some of the advanced electronics and stealth capabilities. That being said, the fifth generation F-35 is coming in at around $83 million per unit and hopefully will be the answer.

The battlefield of the near future is going to be very similar to what our Marines currently face in Helmand Province. The Air Force and their F-22 are geared for the wrong fight. The air strategy developed during the 1990s works well against decently developed countries with conventional militaries. But over the next two decades or so the most pressing security threats that could turn into “hot conflicts” will come from developing countries with low tech/unconventional forces (although North Korea may be very vulnerable to the air warfare doctrine). Effort needs to be placed on cost-effective and easily deployable weapons systems that directly benefits our ground troops and enable them to successfully carry out their missions.

It has been over a month since Iranians took to the streets in protest over election results. It seemed that the violent crack down on the part of the government was going to contain public displays of defiance. The opposition never went away, and there were constant reports of small pockets of street protests and other forms of defiance. However, today the opposition mounted its largest display of defiance since the days immediately following the election.
Rafsanjani gave the Friday sermon this week and thousands of opposition supporters attended and took to the streets. The opposition is not going away and it can still mount a considerable street presence.
At this point the government of Iran should be extremely afraid for the future of its power and influence. As long as they ignore the demands of the opposition, there will always be a challenge to the legitimacy of the government. Force has not been enough to crush the opposition. Meanwhile, the spontaneous and decentralized nature of the opposition makes it extremely hard to thwart. However, if the government gives into the demands of the opposition it may potentially undermine its position. As we have seen in past government-opposition interactions when the government begins to reform following a strong arm period the government elite tends to lose control and finds itself either out of power or extremely marginalized and limited. In the case of Iran, the government put itself in a position where it can’t implement reforms or accept opposition demands without reversing earlier decisions and statements. These reversals disrupt continuity and bring instability.

The last few weeks have turned into a “wait and see” approach by both the government and opposition. The government hopes to outlast the opposition and it certainly has the tools to do so (support of the security apparatus, considerable mass support, and a fair amount of international recognition).  But the opposition has its own strengths that are keeping it alive. Today was a victory for the opposition because it showed its staying power. Rafsanjani effectively publicly endorsed the opposition, and the opposition made a strong showing on the streets. Furthermore, the opposition has strong allies in the Iranian elite and clerical establishment.

Both sides have staying power and are entrenched into their positions. Neither side seems ready to give into the other’s demands. A month later and the opposition is still going strong which suggests that this conflict will not be going away any time soon.