After the 2008 South Ossetia War Russia is unquestionably on the rise to reassert itself as a global power. Russia’s primary concern in the Caucuses is security; as a result it pursues an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Further conflicts involving Russia in the region may be avoided if Russia feels that its southern neighbors are stable. To that end, the United States needs to pursue a policy toward Georgia that ensures its independence but also consolidates its institutions to provide stability and prevent future conflicts. Sixty years ago the United States found itself in a similar position in the Balkans. There are several lessons that the United States can extrapolate out of Cold War Yugoslavia to apply toward successful policy in the Caucuses. Among these lessons are the role of military training and limited arms sales, the necessity capital investment, the impact of state visits, and the importance of high-level official exchanges. Using lessons learned from Cold War Yugoslavia and recognizing that Russia’s primary motive in the region is security, the United States should pursue a policy toward Georgia that bolsters stability and security through a three pillar approach: economic integration, political consolidation, and passive military assistance.
1.1 A Russian History of Aggressive Foreign Policy
Russia’s aggressive actions in the Caucuses are a result of a long history of attempts to impose security and stability. George Kennan in his Long Telegram (1946) noted that “at the bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” The feeling of insecurity is a result of a history of internal and external instability. Under the Tsars the “Russian state’s primary functions [were] the expansion, control, development, and defense of territory” (Medvedev 11). The first Tsars essentially created a national-security state. However, by focusing on state security the Russian state was unable to provide societal security (Medvedev 14). The lack of societal security caused internal instability and weak institutions which the Russian elite counteracted with an aggressive foreign policy (Kennan). In particular, the reigns of Peter I and Catherin II were characterized by constant war as the Russian state consolidated security along its western and southern borders (MacKenzie 12-16). The chaotic politics of Eastern Europe caused Catherin II to repeatedly send troops to Poland in order to secure a friendly government on its western flank (MacKenzie 19). To the south, Russia annexed Georgia in the 19th century as a buffer against a threatening Ottoman Empire (Nygren 156). Russia pushed into the Caucuses because it feared foreign expansion in the region. During the Cold War the Soviet Union developed a series of defensive rings centered on Moscow: Russia proper, the union republics, the Eastern Europe satellite states, vassal states such as Cuba, and the international Communist movements (Medvedev 23-24). Each ring was further insulation from the insecure outside world. From the reign of the Tsars to the Soviet Union, the Russian state has been predominantly concerned with security and stability especially along its borders. As a result the Russian state has pursued an aggressive foreign policy throughout its history from Catherin II in Poland, the Soviets in Eastern Europe, to the current actions in the Caucuses.
1.2 The United States in Eastern Europe
While the Kremlin has pursued an aggressive foreign policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucuses, the United States has traditionally undertaken a far more passive approach. During WWII Franklin D. Roosevelt neglected the status of Eastern Europe as his priorities were focused on winning the war which forced him to avoid any quarrel with the Soviets over Eastern Europe. In essence “American foreign policy towards Eastern Europe was marked by neglect and ignorance” (Brynes 67). The Soviet control over Eastern Europe was too strong; thus, containment became United States policy. However, in the 1960s the United States began to pursue an expansion of economic and cultural ties with Eastern Europe in the hopes that it would reduce Soviet control. In the 1980s United States policy toward Eastern Europe focused on expanding “East European trade with the rest of the world and its participation in the world economy” (Brynes 81). The United States traditionally has had little influence in Eastern Europe and policy typically deferred to acceptance of Soviet control of Eastern Europe. The greatest exception to this trend appeared in Tito’s Yugoslavia beginning in 1948.
2.1 Military Aid and Yugoslavia
United States military assistance to Tito during the 1950s helped to bolster his regime as he established a path independent from Moscow. In 1948 Josip Broz Tito was expelled from the Cominform and Stalin called upon the people to overthrow him (Lees 51). By 1950 the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union had mobilized 364,000 troops along the Yugoslav border (Lees 86). The United States was hesitant to develop a relationship with Tito, but Kennan argued that a neutral stance toward a Yugoslavia under foreign pressure would send the wrong message to Communist countries potentially seeking a break with Moscow. The only way to keep Tito “afloat,” as Lorraine Lees argues, was to send military assistance. The key objective for the United States was to thwart Stalin in the Balkans without provoking him. In 1951 Truman sent the first military aid package totaling $77.5 million (Lees 111). The arms shipments, while small, had a psychological effect on Yugoslavia since it indicated that the United States was committed to Yugoslav security (Lees 99). Throughout the 1950s United States military assistance was limited to surplus weaponry, but quickly arms shipments became a difficult issue. When Stalin died in 1953 the military threat to Tito disappeared (Lees 210). Arms shipments from Western nations made it difficult for Tito to take a completely independent course in the Non-Aligned Movement. In the United States, Congress was growing increasingly restless over sending military aid to a communist, repressive dictator. By 1957 military aid was limited to replacement parts for US supplied equipment (Lees 226). Military assistance was crucial for bolstering the Yugoslav armed forces against an actual Soviet threat, but overtime when the threat disappeared, arms shipments proved to be a burden on both the United States government and Tito.
2.2 Economic and Military Aid to Yugoslavia
After the 1960s economic aid and political overtures proved to be more effective in improving lasting relations with Yugoslavia than military aid. Under President Nixon the “main objectives of the United States policies toward Yugoslavia remained to (1) support its independence from Moscow, (2) to foster Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, and (3) to provide support for Yugoslavia’s economic reforms” (Mocnik 116). Nixon’s objectives indicated that the emphasis of United States policy had shifted to economics. From 1945 to 1961 economic aid to Yugoslavia totaled $1,587 million which made it the second largest recipient of United States’ investments (Mocnik 40). Since Yugoslavia was cut off from the Soviet bloc it had no source for economic investment other than the United States. Yugoslavia became dependent on the United States for economic growth. Under President Carter the economic integration expanded as the United States government arranged for joint economic ventures and industrial investment projects that were badly needed by Yugoslavia (Mocnik 188). Also during the Nixon and Carter administrations several high level state visits occurred. While the visits helped ease tensions, they were more symbolic and had few concrete achievements (Mocnik 206). Lower level exchanges between defense officials arranged during the Carter administration proved to be far more effective. For example, the “exchanges between Harold Brown – the first American Defense Secretary ever to visit Yugoslavia – and his counterpart General Nikola Ljubičić…resulted in a successful military sales agreement” (Mocnik 189). Similar agreements on economic issues were also brokered through the same process. Economic aid and political engagement were important in consolidating the Yugoslav government and making it able to maintain its independent path.
3.1 A Three Pillar Approach to U.S.-Georgia Foreign Policy
Based on lessons drawn from Yugoslavia the United States should implement a policy that addresses the economic, political, and military needs of Georgia. However, there are important differences between Cold War Yugoslavia and contemporary Georgia that need to be addressed. First, the objective of United States policies in the two cases is different. In Yugoslavia the United States attempted to use Tito as a wedge to drive apart the Soviet bloc (Lees 43). In Georgia, United States actions are not meant to undermine the Russian Federation. In 2004 United States Secretary of State Colin Powell stressed “that the United States is not trying to squeeze Russia out of the Caucuses” (Nygren 157). Second, Tito and Georgian President Saakashvili have different attitudes toward the United States. Tito was a communist who turned to the United States out of necessity while Saakashvili is strongly pro-Western (Nygren 157). Despite these potential discrepancies, the comparison is useful and practical because during the Cold War, Yugoslavia was the only independent country of strategic importance on the East-West divide where the United States had any influence. Similarly, today Georgia lies on the Russia-Europe divide and has become a center of contention between the two blocks. Also, the current military threat to Georgia cannot be understated. In the early 1950s Yugoslavia faced a potential invasion by a vastly superior Soviet military (Lees 86). Likewise, Russian forces are poised to intervene in Georgia at a moment’s notice (US State Department). The similarities between the Yugoslav and Georgian situations are strong enough to warrant the application of some of the Yugoslav policies to the current case in Georgia. United States policy should focus on stabilizing Georgia through economic, political, and military support while at the same time cooperating with Russia to ease fears in the Kremlin.
3.2 The First Pillar: Economic Assistance and Integration
As the first pillar, economic aid needs to focus on integrating Georgia with the world market. Yugoslavia’s economic growth beginning in the 1950s was due to efforts by the United States to integrate Yugoslavia into Western markets. Georgia is still highly dependent on Russia for trade and especially fuel (Jackson 121). That dependency has decreased in the last two years as economic relations soured alongside political relations (Kerry and Dreier). Just as the United States invested in industries in Yugoslavia where Russian counterparts had left, the United States should invest in infrastructure and industrial projects that were damaged by the recent war. The proper organization to handle market integration would be the European Union. In the past few years “Georgian relations with the EU [have] been fairly low-key” (Nygren 158). As of late, attempts have been made toward greater cooperation between the EU and Georgia (Nygren 158). The United States should help facilitate greater cooperation and where necessary provide assistance to the Georgian government to meet demands required by the EU. Also the United States should enter into bilateral trade talks with Georgia (Kerry and Dreier). A more robust economy is one important part in stabilizing Georgia and could stimulate political reform and stability.
3.3 The Second Pillar: Political Reform and Consolidation
Political reform and cooperation is the second pillar functioning toward promoting a stable Georgia. In Yugoslavia the United States had little leverage to suggest political reform since the United States feared pushing too hard on Tito to the point where he would possible return to closer ties with Moscow. The government in Tbilisi wants closer integration with the West; thus, the United States is in a position where it can require reforms as preconditions for stronger ties and awards (Nygren 157). The United States should continue current government reform programs being conducted by the State Department such as promotion of an independent media, greater transparency, party competitiveness, and legal reform (US State Department). As in Yugoslavia political cooperation should come in the form of state visits or preferably exchanges of high level officials. The Nixon state visits achieved little which suggests that mere symbolic visits are potentially a waste and may even be counterproductive if the visit threatens United States relations with Russia. The United States should reduce the visibility of Georgian head of state visits to the United States after several “pompous” visits in 2004 and 2006 aggravated relations with Russia (Nygren 157). Head of state visits should only be conducted if tangible results can be expected. Exchanges of high level officials should be encouraged. Under the Carter administration such exchanges with Yugoslav defense officials achieved several agreements. The exchanges will build confidence among the governments in Washington, DC and Tbilisi which may aid in implementing reform proposals. The crux of the political consolidation pillar is the continuation and expansion of current reform measures which would strengthen the Tbilisi government and reduce the political instability that is currently threatening Georgia.
3.4.1 The Third Pillar: Military Assistance
Military aid comprises half of the third pillar involving military assistance and reform. In Yugoslavia, United States military assistance was crucial for bolstering the Yugoslav army especially since it was no longer receiving weapons systems from the Soviets after 1948 (Lees 51). Likewise, the Georgian army needs to be rebuilt after its devastating loss to the Russians in 2008. Currently NATO provides $20 million worth of equipment, and the United States provides another $40 million for training purposes (Nygren 156-157). Military aid to Georgia should continue at the current level; however, the issue of military aid is a touchy subject especially in a conflict zone. While not fully comparable to Tito’s repressive dictatorship, Saakashvili has not held to his democratic promises (Antidze and Robinson). In the future there could be increased pressure from Congress to reduce military aid to an undemocratic leader in a conflict zone. Also just as Tito found it difficult to pursue an independent political course while accepting military aid from the United States, Georgia may find it difficult to reestablish relations with Russia while accepting NATO and United States military assistance. Any military aid sent to Georgia should not be offensively oriented. The United States should continue the current programs to reform and train the Georgian military, law enforcement, and border guards (US State Department). While these missions may be considered offensive by some Russian officials, former President Putin in 2002 did not oppose US special forces training Georgian security forces (Medvedev 46). By strengthening the competence of Georgia’s counterterrorism forces the Georgian government will be able to better handle the inflow of Chechen rebels which was one of Russia’s biggest qualms with Georgia (Nygren 164). Finally, all aid programs should be transparent and open to review by the international community and where possible the Russian government should be given oversight and the ability to participate. The purpose of military assistance is to increase the effectiveness of current forces so that Georgia can properly maintain security and stability in its territory.
3.4.2 The Third Pillar: NATO and Regional Security
The role of alliances and regional security is the final portion of the third pillar. Georgia has been pushing for NATO membership, but extending the alliance into the Caucuses should be postponed indefinitely. Many alliance members have “trepidations about the wisdom of extending Article V protections (NATO’s mutual defense commitment) to the country given unresolved “frozen conflicts” between the government and separatist regions” (Hofmann 8). Potentially, the current standoff and instability could easily spiral out of control in the Caucuses allowing for Georgia to invoke Article V. No response by NATO would severely tarnish the alliance’s credibility. Furthermore, continued NATO expansion would increase tensions with Russia. As NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s, Russia strengthened its security ties with its neighbors such as Belarus: “the decision to enlarge NATO eastward triggered a political-military “response” from the two former Soviet states with defense and security cooperation leading the way” (Szyszlo 1). The Kremlin viewed NATO expansion as a threat to its national security so it pursued its own security alliances. Thus, NATO expansion into the Caucuses could cause Russia to pursue stronger military ties with its allies in the region further cementing an East-West division. Yugoslavia never joined NATO, yet the United States was still able to aid the Yugoslav security situation. Likewise, the United States and other powers can provide security to Georgia outside the formal alliances. On the issue of regional security, the United States should work towards resolving the current conflict in the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The United States should continue to demand a unified Georgia with substantial autonomy for the two regions (US State Department). However, the United States needs to recognize that Russia has stationed 7,600 troops in the two regions that have had de facto independence for nearly twenty years (US State Department). If Russian control of the two regions brings stability to the Caucuses then the United States may have to accept the current status quo. Georgia and Russia will have tense relations as long as Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain a salient security concern (Nygren 119). The primary objective of United States policy in the Caucuses should be security and stability by reducing tensions caused by the 2008 South Ossetia War and establishing a cooperative relationship with Russia.
4.1 Conclusion
In order to create stability in the Caucuses the United States should pursue three approaches to its policy toward Georgia: economic integration, political reform and consolidation, and military assistance. It is important that United States policy does not focus solely on Georgia. Russia is a key player in the region and its influence cannot be ignored. The main objective of Russian foreign policy is security of its borders. Since the first Tsars, Russian leaders have pursued an aggressive foreign policy to address instability. Thus, Russia’s aggressive and militaristic actions in the Caucuses are primarily driven by a desire to secure an extremely unstable neighbor. The implication for United States policy in the region is that non-aggressive efforts to forge stability will not be strongly opposed from the Kremlin. Provocative actions such as expanding NATO or increasing the United States military presence will cause vehement opposition by Russia, but more passive actions such as counterterrorism training or political reforms will cause little outcry by the Kremlin. If Georgia becomes stable, Russia will have little incentive to aggressively intervene. During détente United States leaders performed a balancing act in Yugoslavia as they sought to give support to Tito without provoking Moscow. Similarly today the United States needs to help consolidate the government in Tbilisi without damaging relations with Russia. Recent overtures by Russian President Medvedev suggest that Russia is seeking to thaw relations with the United States. President Barack Obama should use the thaw to establish greater cooperation between the global powers and emphasize that Moscow and Washington, DC have a shared interest in the Caucuses. Both countries want to bring stability to the region. Stability in Georgia can be achieved by integrating the economy with global markets, pushing political reforms that make the state more responsive, and passive military assistance that strengthens the state’s authority within its currently controlled territory.
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