The Great Lakes region of central Africa has long been a contentious area. The current outbreak of violence is really a continuation of a conflict that began in the early 1990s. The core issue is the operation of militia groups in the region.
Mobutu Sese Seko, always fearful of his loss of power, backed the Hutu government in Rwanda. When genocide broke out in Rwanda, Mobutu continued to support the Hutu militias and the Interahamwe. The Interahamwe and other associated figures fled to eastern Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo) after the Tutsi took control of the country. However, the fighting did not stop and the Hutu militias not only launched attacks on DRC Tutsi but carried out attacks across the border into Rwanda and Uganda. In response Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi launched a campaign across the border and supported rebel Laurent Kabila. Mobutu was easily toppled but Kabila’s new government soon turned on its former backers. With Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers stationed in the DRC, Kabila began to fund Hutu rebel groups to undermine Rwanda. War broke out as Uganda and Rwanda supported their actions by their need to protect their national security interests. In the early 2000s a cease-fire was reached the major sticking point as been the presence of Hutu and Tutsi rebel groups operating within the DRC’s borders.
Negotiations in the conflict have always been associated with the demobilizing of the militia groups. Mediators felt that by disarming all rebel factions tensions between the DRC and Rwanda/Uganda would be significantly reduced. Efforts included increased transparency gradual disarmament reciprocated by all parties to the conflict. Besides the historical context why are militia groups important?
The DRC “needs” the militias to protect its security near the eastern border. Initially, Kabila’s primary military backers were the Rwandan and Ugandan armies. When he turned on those two countries, he was left with the ragtag DRC army. He only had military control over Kinshasa. In order to exert control over the rest of the country, he relied on the Hutu militias. Likewise, Uganda and Rwanda soon turned to rebel Tutsi groups combat the Hutu militias. States turn to militias because they fail to exert military hegemony with their own government forces. However, since these groups are independent (besides some state funding and logical support) of the state they often have their own agenda. The resource rich Great Lakes region is a gem for all the factions operating in the DRC.
Ironically, by supporting the Hutu militias Kinshasa to protect its short term security interests, it is undermining its sovereignty and long term security. During the outbreak of violence in the late 1990s Rwanda cited that it would keep its military forces in the DRC as long as the Hutu militias were active. It seems that by simply demobilizing the Hutu militias, Rwanda and Uganda would have no reason to operate in the DRC.
Of course this is naive. First, Rwanda would like access to some of the resources in eastern Congo. Throughout the conflict all sides have been accused of plundering. Second, the Tutsi militias such as those led by Laurent Nkunda, are supported by Rwanda but are ultimately independent. Nkunda claims that he protects the Tutsi minority in the region form Hutu aggression. The DRC lacks an effective military to combat the Tutsi militias. Thus, Kinshasa relies on the Hutu militias to combat domestic insurgencies.
The solution? To begin with there needs to be trust building between the state actors. Rwanda must keep its forces within its own borders and the DRC needs to prevent cross border raids. Second, there needs to be a respect for human rights especially among the Tutsi minority. Nkunda gains some support for his image as a protector of the Tutsis. Third, all militias must be demobilized. This step has to come after the first two otherwise there will be little incentive to remove support for the militias. International mediation will be required as will a far larger peacekeeping force. Finally, the government in Kinshasa must be strengthened in order to fill the power vacuum in the eastern Congo. The replacement of the militias with the DRC government and military will make all future clashes be between state actors which can be more easily mediated through the international system. The political element also includes developing a better resource distribution system. This last step is a long term solution and the resource element will be impractical as long as Kinshasa is able to exploit the region. However, it is conceivable that a removal of militias and a stronger government presence would enable a more fair distribution of resources.
The presence of militias is a sign that the state does not have complete sovereighty. States turn to militias to extend their influence but in the process they undermine their sovereignty by creating a faction that competes with the state’s military hegemony. Colombia and its support of the paramilitaries is a perfect example. It is significant that no stable democracy (with the notable exceptions of Spain and the United Kingdom before the 1990s) has a salient militia group operating within its borders. Militias only undermine the state; thus, a solution in central Africa must involve the demobilization of all militia groups.