Marin Forum

I wrote the following in October 2009 after the DPJ came to power. I think it is fitting to publish this work now that Hatoyama has resigned and the DPJ has struggled to govern.

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In one election fifty four years of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule in Japan ended. To many Japanese the fall of the LDP was a shock, yet there was a certain inevitability to the ousting of the LDP by the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) this August. The LDP experienced a gradual erosion of efficiency and legitimacy. More importantly is that the factors at stake are not unique to the Japanese system but can undermine any sitting government.

Several factors contributed to the fall of the LDP. Japanese politics following the post-war years faced a series of “shocks to the system.” Japan experienced several economic crises beginning with the oil shock of 1973 to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Economic difficulties made it harder for the LDP to keep its promise of sustained economic growth. During this same time period the LDP faced a series of high profile corruption scandals involving high ranking officials. These events coupled together hurt the integrity of the LDP.

In the 1990s Japan introduced several electoral reforms. Japan moved toward single-member districts which favor a two party system. Electoral contests focused more on competition between parties than competition amongst individuals. The DPJ, as the second largest party in Japan, had the most to gain from these reforms. From 1996 to 2004 the DPJ gained over 100 seats in the Lower House. Furthermore, electoral reform caused a split in the LDP and the emergence of several small parties. As a result the LDP has typically been forced to enter into coalition governments with the breakaway factions. By the 2000s the LDP no longer had a monopoly on power.

Berkeley political science professor Darren Zook argues that the LDP’s loss of a power is a direct result of its loss of legitimacy due to inefficiency. According to Zook, since Junichiro Koizumi was Prime Minister the government has been completely inept (at least in the eyes of the Japanese electorate). Under this argument electoral reform, economic trends, and corruption play a secondary role. The LDP has long been corrupt even when it was firmly in power. Likewise, the LDP held onto power several decades after the economy began to slump. Lastly, even after electoral reforms the LDP roughly maintained their share of the Lower House and had a landslide victory in 2005.

Inefficiency is essentially the culmination of all the previous factors. Corruption increases transaction costs which results in inefficiency. An inefficient government is unable to properly respond to economic and political crises; thus, it becomes inept from the perspective of the electorate and loses legitimacy. At this point, regime change becomes possible.

What happened to the LDP in Japan was not unique: the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico faced a similar fate in 2000. Like the LDP, the PRI was extremely corrupt but had brought economic growth and political stability. However, by the 1990s the PRI was viewed by the electorate as unable to address Mexico’s problems. The PRI leadership struggled in the wake of natural disasters in the 1980s, the economic crises of the 1980s that afflicted all of Latin America, and increasing political violence and assassinations in the early 1990s. Thus, the much of the electorate saw them as inept and voted for the opposition in the 2000 presidential elections.

Singapore and the People’s Action Party (PAP) provide another example of the importance of efficiency. The PAP, which has ruled Singapore since its independence in 1963, is extremely efficient. Professor Zook suggests that there is no corruption and the government has expertly managed the economy even through global downturns. Zook further argues that today there is no chance that the PAP could fall from power. However, he pointed out that a move toward a multi-party system is not out of the question. One claim that one-party rule is inefficient since it suppresses innovative ideas that can help Singapore remain competitive in the global economy is gaining traction in Singapore. But as long as the system remains efficient and competitive the PAP will be securely in power.

The cases of Mexico and Singapore show that the events bringing down the LDP were not unique to Japanese politics nor were they unpredictable. The difficulty is pinpointing the exact moment when the ruling party becomes completely inefficient to the point where it loses all legitimacy. The key lesson is that inefficiency and its effects are not confined to one-party governments but affect any ruling regime from kleptocracies in Africa to liberal democracies in the heart of Europe.

As for Japan’s near future, the country is at a crossroads. On one side there is a sense of hope and excitement. For the first time in over fifty years the people can shape Japanese politics in a fundamentally new direction. On the other side there is anxiety and fear that the DPJ will be no better than the LDP. Already in Mexico the PRI has mounted a strong comeback after the summer 2009 midterm elections and are the front-runners for the 2012 presidential elections. Likewise, the LDP could reorganize itself in opposition and come back to power if the DPJ falters. The DPJ would be best to recognize that the factors that brought down the LDP could easily stymie the new DPJ government.

The modern human rights movements finally gained momentum in the 1970s and since then people have been seeking ways to pressure governments. In cases of state led genocide or systematic human rights violations people have turned to disinvestment or “divestment.” However, in the end of the day divestment is simply economic sanctions without teeth. In other words: ineffective. Divestment had some effect in South Africa but was not the death knell to Apartheid, it was completely ineffective in Sudan, and it is a waste of time in Israel.

Geopolitics, not divestment and humanitarian concerns, toppled the National Party and Apartheid in South Africa. The date of the end of Apartheid as official policy is significant – 1990 when President De Klerk announced that he would repeal the discriminatory laws. Five thousand miles away, the Berlin Wall fell four months earlier.

South Africa was the site of one of the many proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States supported the white National Party while the Soviet Union supported the ANC and many of South Africa’s antagonistic neighbors. As long as the Soviets maintained an influence in South Africa the United States government would continue supporting the National Party and Apartheid, since pressuring the South African government on Apartheid would potentially endanger a “vital partnership” in the fight against Communism. In 1990 the Soviets were gone and South Africa lost any strategic importance to the United States. With no more support from the United States, isolation from the international community, and continued domestic unrest from the ANC and other anti-Apartheid groups (after-all these were legitimate opposition groups and not Soviet pawns) the South African government had no choice but to end Apartheid.

Divestment did not have an effect until after the Berlin Wall fell. By this time divestment was backed by State support. Unlike other attempts at divestment, the anti-Apartheid movement gained national support in the US Congress and Senate which passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. President Reagan opposed the act (he even vetoed it although it was overridden) and did not seriously enforce it. As a result trade actually increased between South Africa and the United States between 1988 and 1998. By 1990 divestment had morphed into economic sanctions that were enforced by the state actors.

Divestment did nothing to stop genocide in Darfur. Initially the Bush Administration was hesitant call the conflict in Darfur genocide since the Government of Sudan had a role to play in the War on Terror. Furthermore, by the time the Save Darfur Coalition had raised enough international awareness the conflict had changed from genocide to civil war and civil unrest. As many observers predicted the conflict wore itself out although there is still no resolution to the violence.

The divestment that did occur had little to no effect on Sudan. In fact Sudan’s GDP grew 10% in 2006 and 2007. The difference between South Africa in 1990 and Sudan in the 2000 was globalization. For every “western” firm that pulled out of Sudan, a Chinese or Indian firm took its place. Under Clinton the United States imposed sanctions on Sudan due to its connections to international terrorism and human rights abuses in Southern Sudan. The US oil firms were forced to leave, but they were quickly replaced by the Chinese who now play a large role in the Sudanese economy. Due to this new dynamic, the United States is forced to negotiate with Russia and China to develop any credible international sanctions. If unilateral economic sanctions are no longer enough to force policy change then how can divestment that has no enforcement mechanism possibly be effective?

It is for these reasons that divestment cannot possibly work in Israel. Economically, divestment has some potential for success. Israel has very little friends outside Europe and the United States. China would be hesitant to invest in Israel because it would jeopardize its crucial investments and contracts in Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, in today’s globalized world it is more than likely that a budding firm from an emerging market would set up shop in Israel to make a quick buck in the absence of the large multinational firms. The problem with divestment in Israel is political. Like in South Africa, divestment will be ineffective as long as the US government supports the Israeli government. And the US is not going to be withdrawing its support from Israel anytime soon.

Israel has something that neither the Apartheid government or the Sudanese government had: AIPAC, the most powerful lobbying group in the country. South Africa or Sudan never had a strong lobbying in the US to argue on its behalf. Every major politician listens to AIPAC and seeks their endorsement. Immediately after Vice President Biden’s disastrous trip to Israel, Secretary of State Clinton was quick to speak before AIPAC on the importance of the US-Israel relationship. Effective divestment in Israel would require one of the government largest policy changes in history.

Divestment in Israel poses one last problem. The Israel-Palestine conflict is a security dilemma. Israel will not go to the negotiating table until it is certain that its borders and existence are secured. Palestine will not go to the table until Israel settlements and abuses stop. A divestment campaign that is aimed at targeted Israel’s ability to acquire defense weaponry will make Israel feel less secure. Meanwhile mortars and rockets will continue to enter Palestine. Divestment will not push Israel to the negotiating table.

Unfortunately, divestment is nothing more than a symbolic act that has very little effect on policy while hurting US businesses. American and European companies divested from Sudan and the Sudanese government found less squeamish firms and continued its genocidal policies. In South Africa divestment only had an effect once the United States was no longer willing to support the National Party. Divestment was then backed by political action but then this is no longer divestment but an economic sanction. Thus, in Israel divestment will never work until it is backed by political support from the United States government (essentially the US government placing sanctions on Israel).

In the last three decades there have been many attempts to democratize foreign policy. However, this immediately comes into conflict with an international system that only recognizes nation states as sovereign actors. People can divest and they can protest but in the end of the day the power to change foreign policy rests in the hands of the national foreign policy establishments.

Why is NATO strong? Powerful economies, United States hegemony, and sophisticated weaponry all play a role in answering this question, but perhaps the most crucial answer is identity. A superpower can force a security organization into existence like the Warsaw Pact and economies can band together to defend their interests like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) but they need something more to sustain them. Formal institutions are important for sustainability but they do not explain how and why these organization are formed in the first place. Why does a nation enter into a security organization in the first place?

The obvious first answer is the presence of an external threat. But in order for that threat to be recognized there needs to be a “collective consciousness” or identity that identifies the threat as a threat. Let’s take the example of NATO. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the Western powers in response to potential aggression from the Soviet Union. And it was a defense pact for the idea of liberal democracy. Thus, identity has both an external and internal component. Externally it creates an “us” and “them” distinction; while internally it is a set of common values. A security organization arises when there is an external threat to a set of communal values that are worth protecting. Hence, the strength of the security organization will depend on the strength of the identity formation.

For example, the Warsaw Pact was never as strong as NATO despite far superior conventional forces because its internal identity was formed by Soviet hegemony. Communism was a foreign institution for the Eastern bloc whereas liberal democracy developed naturally in the NATO members. The Warsaw Pact quickly fell apart when the external identity dimension – the threat of Western military aggression – disappeared and the internal dimension – Communism supported by Soviet hegemony – dissolved.

Identity is a social construct so it can take an almost limitless number of forms. In security organizations one of the most common is an identity based on geography. NATO was the north Atlantic region (itself a social construct – prior to the twentieth century there was no concept of the North Atlantic region ) and later included all of Europe. SEATO was Southeast Asia (likewise Southeast Asia did not exist as a concept until after decolonization and has only recently been articulated as an identity). Religion has been another way to form an identity. Islamic countries formed the Organization of the Islamic Conference to safeguard their interests (although this is not a security organization). Race has been another common identity formation. The colonial powers entered into alliances with local tribes that appeared more Caucasian or “western.” Likewise, memos from the US State Department show officials hesitant to form alliances with “inferior Asiatic races.” A common history is a further source of identity formation. European nations entered alliances with their former colonies and the United States entered SEATO with the Philippines citing the common struggle against the Japanese. Lastly, identity can form around ideology or world view. The cornerstone of NATO is the protection of the liberal democratic world order. The League of Nations or the United Nations were formed on the liberal notions of world order. No particular identity construction is stronger than another since a certain construction will only become salient under certain conditions. In the United Nations, a multicultural organization, race plays little role in identity formation while ideology, the commitment to the UN Charter (a liberal document), is the key identity construct.

A security organization’s strength is related to the number of identity constructs present. NATO is strong because the geographic, racial, religious, historical, and ideological constructs are all present. The presence of numerous constructs allows the organization to emphasis or de-emphasis certain constructs based on the situation. Had NATO  been solely a religious organization (Christian-secular) it would have been very difficult  to incorporate Turkey (Islamic-secular). Instead NATO emphasized its  historical and ideological constructs (along with the external threat dimension) and as a result Turkey provides the second largest standing army in the NATO alliance. The presence of more constructs makes the organization more stable since when a certain construct becomes a volatile issue the organization can quickly shift its identity to a different construct.

The relationship between the internal and external formation of identity is vital for the strength of the organization. Just as the organization can shift its internal identity among its shared identity constructs, the organization can shift its emphasis between its internal and external identity formations. In the case of Turkey the threat of communism and the Soviet Union provided further reason to join NATO in the absence of shared internal identity constructs. Following the end of the Cold War NATO shifted its focus toward its internal identity formation in order to keep the alliance relevant as it lacked an external identity dimension. When both dimensions of identity are present the organization is strong as NATO was during the Cold War; if one dimension disappears than the organization will weaken over the long term.

Today commentators say that NATO is facing an “identity crisis.” And they are right because NATO has lost its external identity and could face an erosion of its internal identity. The threat is no longer coming from the Soviet Union or communism. The United States has tried to frame the threat as Islamic fundamentalism but not all NATO members view this threat on the same level as they did with communism. NATO enters the twenty-first century without a strong external identity dimension. Even internally NATO is showing some cracks. Eastward expansion threatens to undermine its internal identity. Liberal democracies with market economies in the North Atlantic region (and later nearly seamlessly expanded to the European continent) form NATO’s internal identity. Does the inclusion of Georgia in NATO undermine its liberal democracy identity? Historically not all members of NATO were liberal democracies, but in today’s NATO Portugal, Spain, and Greece are democracies and Turkey is democratizing. Clearly the inclusion of Israel or Iraq (as some have suggested) would undermine its geographic identity. Thus, NATO’s problems are not caused by weakening institutions, transatlantic bickering, or the decline of the United States’ unipolar moment, but the erosion of the elements that formed NATO’s identity.

What are the implications for a European Union defense organization? At the moment the outlook is bleak. Externally, an EU Security Organization faces the same dilemma as NATO. There is no clear external threat to the EU especially since terrorism is not as big of a focus for Europeans as it is for the United States. Internally, there is no agreement on what constitutes a European identity or if it even exists. There is an elite identity for Europe that has been at the heart of European integration (an economically prosperous and peaceful Europe that is a beacon for democratic values, international law, and human rights) but it remains just that – a viewpoint held by Eurocrats in Brussels. There is nothing to stand up against nor anything to protect. Thus, a EU security organization is not possible until there is an external tangible and serious threat to the EU or a common salient European identity.

Identity tells us what to cherish and who are our enemies. Without identity there is no reason to form a security organization because there is nothing to fight for or against.

Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.

The above quote from Robert Kagen, while overstating the divide between the United States and Europe, is nevertheless accurate on the subject of war. World War II was a turning point as continental Europe rejected war while the United States filled the void that the Europeans had recently vacated. Of course European nations still fought bloody conflicts during decolonization but they did so alone (unless “Communists” were involved) and often without the solid backing of their citizens. By the 1980s European nations were effectively demobilized.

Today this attitude is present in European museums. Most European capitols have museums dedicated to military history and often the doors to these museums were opened around the turn of the century. The collections prior to WWII present a grandeur and tame version of war. Portraits of generals adorn the walls, guns and swords glitter in display cases, and mannequins are dressed in full regalia. The 19th century was a highpoint for European empires and war machines. Then a striking change occurs as the museum turns to the 20th century. The glorification of war is replaced by highlighting the horrors of the battlefield and the hardships of the home-front. Genocide is a common topic from the Holocaust to Yugoslavia to Darfur. The period from the 1920s to 1945 are often wiped from the history of the museum in countries that joined the Axis even though this period saw the rapid development and advancement of military technology. The grand portraits are replaced by photographs and movies that show the realistic angle of war.

This is most striking at Versailles in France. One wing of the palace houses floor to ceiling grand murals that celebrate military victories and heroic kings or generals. Juxtaposed next to the murals are photographs from WWII, the wars of decolonization, Vietnam, and Iraq. A picture of FDR, Churchill, and Stalin at Yalta is placed next to a 18th century painting of a war council. A picture from the prisoner abuses at Abu-Ghraib is placed next to a rather tame painting of prisoners of war. Photographs do not as easily hide the realities of war. Europe at the turn of the century glorified war while the Europe of the second half of the 20th century has turned to a realistic view of war that does not shy away from the horrors of combat.

In Brussels the Royal Museum of the Armed Forces and of Military History has a contemporary warfare section. A large section of the exhibit is focused on World War II and contains many Nazi items; however, interspersed are reminders of the Holocaust, concentration camps, and the destruction of the home-front. Another part of the exhibit has an in depth look at horrors faced by Ukrainian Jews under the Nazis. Close by a projector shows pictures and words from the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides. War is not divorced from the destruction and horror that it causes.

In contrast US museums or high school textbooks do not provide the same treatment of war. The Holocaust is covered in depth but to an American audience it feels more distant. Instead the art of war is glorified. Aircraft carriers and battleships have been turned into floating museums; hangers are full of fighter jets and stealth aircraft; and the occasional museum may house an intercontinental ballistic missile. We still glorify war because our war machines highlight our technological prowess and superiority. Perhaps slightly startling, but even the Holocaust in the American museum may be portrayed as a victory for United States. The might of the United States military and economic apparatus overcame Hitler’s totalitarian empire and liberated Europe. If Vietnam is not ignored then care is taken to make the distinction that it was a military “victory” but a political defeat. We are still in the height of our military prowess, and like the 19th century Europeans we glorify our exploits.

If the European and American portrayals of war are so vastly different then it is no wonder that our attitudes (and willingness to fight) toward war are different too. In Where have all the soldiers gone? James Sheehan explores the change that Europe experienced. At the outbreak of World War I European took to the streets to celebrate the nation. In 2003 European took to the streets to oppose the US led invasion of Iraq. In part WWII was a moral defeat for Europe. The entire continent was ravaged by war, and European had no desire to experience it again. Militarism was linked to the rise of the Third Reich; thus, the best way to avoid another war would be to reject the war machine all together. And the European nations were able to demobilize under the security guarantees of the United States. The specter of Soviet invasion of western Europe could have caused those nations to maintain their conventional armies but the United States made the decision that nuclear weapons were the most economic way to counter the Soviet threat.

The post-war leaders of Europe turned away from war and strove to portray the realities. Thus, the European war museums are full of reminders of the rise of Hitler and the Holocaust. By doing so the next generation grew up rejecting war which further demobilized the European military apparatus (Britain and France have standing armies that are barely twice the size of the peak US troop deployment in Iraq). As a result Europe is not only unwilling to use force except in absolutely necessary situations but it is also unable to use force. Kagan observed that European armies lack force projection capabilities. The United States is the only navy to field supercarriers (although the UK and France are currently developing their own supercarriers). The only heavy bombers belong to the United States and Russia. Furthermore, many European nations lack logistical equipment. Recently, the UK complained about the lack of transport helicopters it has in Afghanistan. Then there is its lack of satellite and communication logistical technology (enter the Galileo project). The difference between US and European capabilities was especially pronounced in the 1990s. Europe was helpless as genocide broke out in the Balkans. France and Belgium suffered further moral defeats in Rwanda. In East Timor the intervention force turned to the US to provide logistic support.

European leaders recognized these shortcomings and sought to fix them. France is working on upgrading its military capabilities and has recently agreed to sell military hardware to Russia. EADS, the European aerospace corporation that also is responsible for Airbus, is working on a new military transport plane- the A400M. Meanwhile, the Lisbon Treaty gives the EU new foreign policy capabilities. However, a more assertive foreign policy by the EU will require it to develop hard power capabilities. There are moments when soft power alone is not effective. But can Europe develop effective hard power capabilities when its citizens are adverse to using hard power?

Thus, we return to Kagan’s quote. The two sides of the Atlantic have very different views on war. But these views are not static. European nations want to play a more prominent role in foreign affairs, and there could come a point where the US is unable or unwilling to provide a security guarantee. Meanwhile, someday the United States may find that its military can no longer provide the necessary solutions. However, Europe only rejected war after millions of its citizens were killed and entire cities were firebombed. The United States has not had to fight a war in its heartland since the Civil War and “total war” has been a foreign concept (and since history is written by the victors the scorched earth policies of General Sherman are forgotten when forming national identity). Could there someday be a merging of viewpoints?

The twentieth and twenty-first century of the United States to a degree mirrors the 17-19th centuries in Europe. War was a essentially a game between monarchs over vast empires. Civilians were spared the hardships of war as battles were fought away from urban centers. Combat may have been horrifying and gruesome for the soldiers but the citizens were kept distant from it so they were able to idealize it. Likewise today the United States is engaged in wars on the other side of the globe. There are no taxes or draft that would place a burden on citizens back home. While today’s media paint a much more realistic view of battles, the average US citizen still does not fully understand the realities of combat. Hence, we glorify war just as the Europeans did up until the 20th century. But could there be a moment when we nostalgically start filling museums with relics of the height of our foreign dominance? Sabers and rifles from the grand European armies of the 19th century fill European museums, so perhaps there will come a time when our superpower moment, filled with Predator drones and M-16s, is relegated to a dusty corner of a museum. In the meantime one has to look no further than the nearest history museum to understand the transatlantic divergence on the use of force.

Two years ago as the United States was entering the economic crisis talk among experts and the political campaigns focused on the green economy as a source of American renewal. The United States would retool its economy and use clean technology to replace the loss of manufacturing jobs in the rust belt, and then it would export its new industry to the developing world. We would develop clean coal technology so we could sell it to China as they further invested in coal fired power plants. We would put people to work and bolster our economic situation vis-a-vis the Chinese.

Two years later and most likely we will soon be importing clean technologies. According to the New York Times, China has now become the leading producer in wind turbines and solar technology. By 2020 China is expected to build 50 new nuclear reactors while the rest of the world might build 15. Meanwhile, clean energy technology has expanded in the United States thanks to the federal stimulus bill, but the United States is still “sleeping” in the words of many Eurocrats. President Obama’s State of the Union address emphasized that if the United States did not embrace the green economy then it would continue to lose jobs overseas and cede its role as world economic powerhouse. Obama made it quite clear: America’s future lies in the green economy.

But efforts in the United States have stalled in the Senate. Germany and Spain have long been on the forefront of green technology and have invested accordingly. China has the advantage that its government still retains significant control over the economy and can mobilize resources for key projects. Does it truly care about environmental protection? The government has placed more emphasis on reducing pollution. For example two years ago it commissioned a study to gather information on pollution throughout the country. However, China’s main concern is its economy. Sustained economic growth is not possible while being completely dependent on foreign sources of energy. As China goes increasing urbanization, its energy demands will increase. Clean energy technology is a matter of national security.

Now is the time to get realistic in the United States. Two issues resonate well with the majority of voters: jobs and energy security (the stability of supply). Climate change is not the ticket to victory. Yes it is bad when the polar bears drown because the arctic ice sheets disappear, but Americans simply don’t care. Climategate has only made things worse. A recent poll shows that more Americans today do not believe in anthropogenic global warming (although more Americans view global warming as a serious threat to their family). Take two bills. Bill A invests X amount of money to create Y jobs in the green sector. Bill B invests X amount of money to reduce emissions by Y. Bill A will have wide bipartisan support while Bill B will will break apart on partisan lines. Both bills could have similar mechanics; in fact they could be part of the same bill: X amount of money is invested in green technology to create Y jobs which reduces emissions by Z.

The problem with cap-and-trade is that it has been labeled a job-killer. Will cap-and-trade kill some jobs? Yes, but in any market mechanism there are winners and losers. Will it destroy the economy? Not at all. Cap-and-trade is not a foreign concept. There already is a cap-and-trade mechanism in place for sulfur dioxide emissions in the Northeast (the acid rain program). The utilities adapted, and the program is widely praised. The Emissions Trading Scheme (the European cap-and-trade program) has had its ups and downs, but it is working.

But maybe we could develop a green economy without cap-and-trade or a carbon tax? Not likely. Tax credits or federal handouts may stimulate green technology sector growth but without the institutional development once the federal support dissipates the growth will stop. It works in China because China is able to mobilize resources on a level that are unimaginable in the United States. Green technology needs a market mechanism to sustain it. A price on carbon is absolutely necessary.

Senator Lindsey Graham is backing comprehensive energy and climate reform (and a price on carbon) because he recognizes that any meaningful energy policy that builds energy security requires a price to be placed on carbon. Under the current circumstances coal and oil are more competitive than renewables. The only way to develop domestic sources of energy is by making fossil fuels more expensive. A cap-and-trade system, cap-and-dividend, a carbon tax, or any other form of carbon pricing is the only way to develop the green economy thus creating jobs and reducing emissions. Even if global warming turns out to be a farce we will still have a net benefit of domestic job growth and increased energy independence. But the latter two are only possible with a price on carbon which means climate legislation.

Eventually renewables will reach grid parity with fossil fuels but we can’t wait. By then we will have been left behind by China and Europe. We are already behind in solar and wind technologies. Instead we need to make the political and monetary investments now. This is why the President is now focusing on carbon capture and storage technologies. The race isn’t close to be over, and there is still room in the solar and wind markets. However, without legislation that puts a price on carbon, the domestic green industry market will remain dormant. Without the green industry the United States will continue to lose jobs to the developing world and remain dependent on foreign sources of fuel.

It’s time to get real. Polar bears don’t win elections but jobs do. We need comprehensive energy and climate legislation since without it America will be a second-rate economy and we would only have ourselves to blame. All options need to be on the table: nuclear, natural gas, clean coal, and biofuels. Jobs, Jobs, Jobs. It is a win-win scenario. We will create the jobs to fuel America’s recovery and in the process we will combat global warming.

But in the meantime we are losing as China takes advantage of the green revolution. Its time to wake up.

Earlier this week Russian President Medvedev gave a speech that many interpreted as a rebuke of the Putin the years. Medvedev stressed the need for economic reform, a pragmatic foreign policy, and the importance of tackling corruption. He specifically stated that the effectiveness of Russian foreign policy “should be judged by a single criterion: Does it contribute to improving living standards in our country?” This is in sharp contrast to Putin’s post-2004 foreign policy that has sought to reassert Russian authority through various blusters. But was this actually an attack on the man who is essentially President Medvedev’s patron?

It is no secret that Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin do not get along. In fact they are rarely seen together in public. The Financial Times likes to point out every assertive statement made by Medevdev while the US press has been far more reserved in suggesting that Medvedev is able to act independently of Mr. Putin.

It just seems improbable that Medvedev would so openly challenge is “patron.” Putin brought Medvedev into government from the private sector. Then in 2005 Putin appointed Medvedev to the post of First Deputy Prime Minister. From there he was chosen to succeed Putin for the presidency. Putin would not have named a successor that couldn’t count on to be a “yes man.” Medvedev may be the face of the Russian state, but Putin is the one with all the power. Furthermore, challenging Putin’s power would seem to be ludicrous since Putin has firmly established the loyalty of the Russian political and economic elite (often by “appointing” former KGB buddies to the major industrial corporations).

Under this this reasoning Medvedev and Putin are playing a good cop-bad cop act. When the Russian state needs to take a softer and more conciliatory stance Mr. Medvedev is on the forefront, and when a tough approach is necessary Mr. Putin is not far away. A much more mild US example would be the Eisenhower-Nixon administration.

But could a split be genuine? Medvedev seemed to have taken a much too independent stance on WTO accession before Putin pulled Russia’s membership bid (humiliating Medvedev in the process). A few months ago Medvedev announced that he would consider running for the presidency again in 2012 stressing that he had his own popularity. Then on Thursday he gave a 140 minute “state of the nation” speech that seeks a new trajectory for Russia. And so the United States and Europe are perplexed.

Yet it was only slightly over twenty years ago that another Russian politician sought a bold trajectory. At first Western leaders were unsure what to make of the loyal Communist Gorbachev. Quickly, Gorbachev made good on his word. Could the loyal Putinist (perhaps formerly) be heading in the same direction?

Actions need to speak for these words before any pronouncement can be made, but US policy towards Russia needs to recognize this possibility. The US would much rather see Mr. Medvedev in office come 2012 than Mr. Putin. For starters the Obama administration needs to make efforts to engage with Medvedev. President Reagan helped end the Cold War when he reached out to Gorbachev. In response, Gorbachev found legitimacy in the international community. Western enthusiasm and support proved critical to Gorbachev. Likewise, Medvedev may not have the support of parts of the Russian oligarchy, international support may provide the necessary legitimacy to keep him afloat.

How does Obama reach out to Medvedev? On this issue Obama should take a lesson from Reagan. In fact Obama is already in the process of doing so through nuclear non-proliferation. Reagan’s strong commitment to preventing nuclear war by reducing nuclear armaments greatly impressed Gorbachev. Through arms limitation talks the two leaders were able to develop a rapport that was extremely influential in bringing about the end of the Cold War. Like Reagan, Obama is committed to a nuclear free world. The centerpiece of restarting relations with Russia has been a new nuclear weapons treaty. The administration certainly hopes that Obama and Medvedev can establish a rapport through nuclear disamament talks.  Furthermore, if Medvedev is truly a moderate liberal pragmatic then there should be elements of Obama’s world vision based on international law and cooperation that appeal to him. If the two trained lawyers can develop a relationship then Mr. Medvedev may find the international legitimacy to sustain a more independent course of action.

There is still reason to engage with Mr. Medvedev even if he does turn out to be completely loyal to Putin. Medvedev and Putin represent two faces of Russian foreign policy. If concrete results can be achieved through the Medvedev approach (cooperation) then Putin and the Russian state will turn towards that path. The hardline approach in Russian policy in part has been a reaction to the unilateral policies of the Bush years. Cooperation and openness with the Russian state in turn encourages the Russian state to cooperate with the international community.

Regardless if there is a split between the two Russian leaders or not, US policy toward Russia needs to focus on engagement and cooperation. The key is trust. Mr. Putin embodies the sense of distrust many Russians feel toward the United States and Western Europe. Likewise, Mr. Medvedev needs to know that he can trust the international community. The international community in turn needs to give him the opportunities and space to operate independently. This means no interference in Russian internal affairs or overt support for any candidate. Medvedev is not going to act independently if the international community just throws him under bus.

It has long been the position of this blog to support the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan (although we may have strongly criticized the strategies). We recognized from the beginning that the Surge in Iraq was the right strategy to set the conditions for an exit strategy and a “stable” Iraq. Likewise, we saw President’s Obama’s promise to step up our efforts in Afghanistan as the right decision. Afghanistan was where all the problems began. However, recent events have shown that Afghanistan is quickly becoming a lost cause.

However, the war effort is not a lost cause for the reasons commonly asserted by the Left. Afghanistan has a history of destroying empires. The historical argument is compelling. After all, efforts by the superpowers to unite the country all ended in humiliation. But, historical determinism theory is usually discredited by historians. It ignores the influence of individuals and events. The Soviet Union was not popular in Afghanistan but their ultimate defeat in the region was due to foreign influence. In 2002 the United States had popular support and things may well have been different with proper leadership. The Afghan people do not want nor do they believe in democracy. This argument is essentially an extension of the bigoted thesis proposed in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Islam and democracy are not incompatible. The Afghan people have little experience with democracy and it is limited to the current democracy under Karzai’s government. Hence, to the Afghan people democracy (as envisioned by the United States) is just more ineffective government. The people aren’t opposed to democracy, they are opposed to corrupt and ineffective government.

The Taliban has become more bold in their attacks as security continues to deteriorate in the country. Our international partners have been hesitant to commit troops and resources and it’s likely that many will begin to pull out their troops in the next year. But more importantly, after eight years the Afghan government still has no legitimacy. The recent elections were clearly fraudulent. Today, President Karzai’s main rival, Abdullah Abdullah, has decided to withdraw from runoff election citing persistent problems of fraud. Thus, the results of any runoff will be seen as illegitimate.

The success to any state building effort must have support from 1) an engaged “lead” state along with the international community and 2) strong and legitimate local rulers. The United States is unquestionably engaged in Afghanistan and is committed to its stability. The problem is that the second criteria does not exist. Karzai may have had enough legitimacy in the beginning of the conflict but he subsequently lost it all. Afghan leaders who have legitimacy remain outside the government because they do not want to be associated with the inept and corrupt Karzai government.

The United States has three options:

1. Afghanization. This strategy consists of accepting the current political situation while making efforts to strengthen the Afghan institutions. Militarily, this strategy involves a gradual troop buildup (20,000-40,000 troops). The problem is that 40,000 more troops makes little difference. Perhaps if the Afghan government had legitimacy a limited troop increase would be helpful. Otherwise, a modest increase in troops will only provide limited security benefits while endorsing the current political situation.
2. Militarization. To provide security to the entire country would probably require a buildup of 100,000+ troops. This would be the exact opposite of Afghanization. Since the NATO allies are unlikely to contribute much the bulk of the buildup would have to come from the United States. This option would put operation of the country more in the hands of the United States; thus, potentially allowing the United States to reshape and strengthen Afghanistan’s political institutions. Such an option is completely impractical. Back in the United States the public couldn’t stomach such a large buildup. The United States doesn’t have the military resources for a sustained, large military buildup. Nor would the United States be seen to be any more legitimate than the current Afghan government.
3. Withdraw. An exit strategy was supposed to look like this: troop increases would allow the Afghan government to strengthen its position. Elections would then yield to the United States handing authority over to the Afghans. Security didn’t improve and the elections were a complete failure. Under ideal circumstances the US would be able to withdraw while leaving a small contingent of troops to provide military training and counterinsurgency operations. But without strong US backing the Afghan government will fall like a house of cards. It has no legitimacy, it is facing a well organized insurgency, and its military is a paper army. Downplaying our role in Afghanistan is complete withdrawal.

Afghanization is the status quo which is unacceptable. Militarization is impractical. Withdrawal is the only option short of reshuffling the Afghan government (is that practical?). But is there someone more effective than Karzai? Politically we are failing in Afghanistan and it is becoming ever harder to reverse eight years of ineffective governance.

Withdrawal will not be pretty. Essentially its a confirmation that the last eight years have been a failure and a waste of resources and lives. It will probably parallel the US evacuation of Vietnam in 1975. It will be demoralizing. Also it will have long term repercussions. NATO may very well lose its relevance. If it can’t handle “out of area” operations then what distinguishes it from the budding defense arrangements under the EU’s Common Security and Foreign Policy? More importantly, Afghanistan will be a failed state which will require the international community’s constant attention. Somalia is a headache for the international community; yet, had it been committed to Somalia’s stability in the early 1990s piracy may very well not be the problem that it is today.  Lastly there is the problem of Pakistan. An unstable Afghanistan may very well bring down the Pakistani government. The US withdraw from Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan state will haunt the US and the international community for years to come.

Yet, these are the effects that the US will have to stomach. Getting out of Afghanistan will free up resources and political capital for Obama’s domestic agenda and his other international efforts. It will change the US-Europe relationship for the better. Instead of focusing efforts on bolstering NATO efforts in a losing effort, Obama and European leaders can turn their efforts toward climate change and nuclear nonproliferation. It is important that the US does not ignore the region like it did in the 1990s. This is where Obama’s diplomatic effort will be critical. The US will need the support of Pakistan, Russia, China, and even Iran to “contain” Afghanistan.

It’s time to get out of Afghanistan. Our efforts in Afghanistan cannot succeed without a legitimate Afghan government. Afghanistan is limiting our foreign policy and is diverting resources and capital from our domestic policy.

In the last few days two stories came to attention: the cancellation of the F-22 program and the statistic that July has been the bloodiest month for coalition forces in Afghanistan since the war began. On the surface these appear to be completely unrelated events. The F-22 has not been assigned to Afghanistan and the recent “surge” in Helmand Province is predominately a ground operation. Where is the connection? It is operations like Operation Khanjar or the surge in Iraq that show why the F-22 is a wasted asset.

In the last two decades military strategy has increasingly shifted toward the use of airpower. One of the stories of the Cold War was the rise of the Air Force as the pre-eminent military branch. World War II showed the significance and importance of airpower. The Allies recognized the destructiveness of airpower and its ability to demoralize the enemy. Thus, in the early years of the Cold War, Air Force generals like Curtis LeMay became prominant in the Pentagon. Until the development of ICBMs the nuclear startegy of the United States relied on bombers as the delivery vehicle (in fact throughout the Cold War, the United States was far more reliant on a nuclear bomber fleet than the Soviet Union). In the Cuban Missile Crisis, LeMay was a strong advocate of bombing military installations in Cuba. The Vietnam War was effectively the culmination of the past twenty years of airpower thinking especially the final bombing operations of the war such as Operation Lineback II.

The 1990s saw a further progression of airpower strategy as it became the centerpiece of US operations. The military apparatus was impressed by the Air Force’s performace in the first Gulf War. Not only did US warplanes dominate Iraqi airspace but the war saw the first use of percision weapons and stealth planes (the F-117 Nighthawk). Bosnia gave the Air Force even more confidence. The common interpretation is that US airpower and use of cruise missiles forced Slobodan Milošević to the peace table. Likewise, in the 1999 Kosovo War many argue that airpower alone defeated Milošević.

Why has the airforce become dominate?

1. It has had some very prominant successes. The Air Force has shown that it can be extremely effective at what it does. The quick ends to the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Bosnia (once NATO began bombing) lend support to this claim. Futhermore, the US Air Force is one of the best equiped air forces in the world. Even the US’s fleet of 30 year old front line fighters are equal or better than any opposing force (although the new Chinese J-10 is most likely superior). Results earn respect; the US Air Force has earned its respect.
2. The air force has become extremely good at procuring new weapons systems. Many of the top research projects in the US military are being developed by the air force. Furthermore, the air force and its contractors have learned to spread their operations around the US. A new airbase not only provided a strategic value but it also provided an economc boost to local communities. The same is true for the military contractors such as Lockheed Martin. The F-22 had considerable support in Congress because various parts of the plane were produced in many members’ districts and were a source of emloyment. The air force knows how to play politics.
3. Finally, Americans do not have the guts for war. Clinton was especially fearful of military casualities. The US quickly pulled out of Somolia after 19 soldiers died over a period of five months. In Kosovo, Clinton refused to send US soldiers because he feared the domestic political backlash. Similar sentiments are held by Europeans which has hampered operations in Afghanistan. As a result political and military leaders have sought “low cost” operations that keep US personnel out of harms way.

This “low cost” strategy essentially relies on the ability for the military to conduct quick and devestateing airstrikes. Technology wise the emphasis is placed on aircraft with long range, high speed, and stealth capabilities. Excluding the revamped versions of the F-16 and F/A-18, all combat aircraft that entered production in the last twenty years have met these criteria (F-117, B-2, F-22, and soon the F-35). These aircraft are perfect for penetrating enemy airspace and bombing, lets say a nuclear reactor, without being detected. Meanwhile, the F-22 can engage with any fighter deployed Russia or China. The problem arises when there are no high priority targets or aerial conflicts with China/Russia.

Thus, we get to the connection with Operation Khanjar. In 2001 the US Air Force ran into a problem in Afghanistan. There were no high priority targets to bomb. It was said “how can we bomb a country into the stone age when it is already in the stone age.” Strategy developed during the 1990s called for the Air Force to target key infrastructure  (including civilian) and military assets. By crippling infrastructure and communications the enemy would fold. The Air Force was tired of targeting tanks and other field equipment as was common in the Gulf War and the Bosnian War. However, Afghanistan did not have the infrastructure, and the Taliban was able to operate without it. In 2003 Saddam’s army was easily routed but the high tech airforce was completely incapable of eliminating the resulting insurgency. Then in 2006 the Isreali air bombardments during the 2006 Lebanon War failed to achieve any of Isreal’s objectives.

Even the so called “successes” of airpower, Bosnia and Kosovo, were less successful then they are portaryed to be. In both Bosnia and Kosovo airpower was believed to be the decisive factor. Upon closer examination this claim falls apart. In Bosnia, Milošević capitulated because the Croatian army was making rapid gains. Yes, Milošević was rather shocked by NATO firepower and that certainly played a role but the deciding factors were the conditions on the ground. In Kosovo other factors explain why Milošević surrendered. It finally appeared that President Clinton was committed to sending ground troops and NATO promised to deploy 50,000 troops. Perhaps more importantly, Moscow refused to give crucial support to Belgrade. Milošević was out of oppotions and saw surrender as the only way to maintain his regime. However, another lesson can be learned from Kosovo. The NATO bombings of Belgrade created significant negative opinion toward the West among Serbs. Timothy Garton Ash argues that the NATO bombings completely undermined the student demonstrations against  Milošević that were present before the war. Futhermore, the intial NATO bombings encouraged Serbs to commit more “ethnic cleansing” (although proponents of the air war argue that had NATO been more aggressive initially the reciprocated killings could have been prevented). Air power alone does not seem to be the end all solution.

The 2006 “Surge” in Iraq showed a new approach to military strategy. Greater emphasis would be placed on ground forces securing the area and embedding with the local population. Likewise, now in Afghanistan we are seeing a new “surge.” The occupation of a country greatly dimenishes the necessity for stealth, and the low tech nature of the Taliban makes the advanced electronics of the new generation of aircraft useless. The 50 year old B-52 is just as effective and more reliable than the stealthy  B-2. Meanwhile, the F-16s and F/A-18s are perfectly capable of performing the strike capabilities that were supposed to be carried out by the F-22 and F-35. Thus, we find ourselves with a weapon that has no practical battlefield use.

The F-22 was designed to counter any fighter produced by Russia or China. Since a conflict with Russia or China are effectively out of the question, the only potential threat is from high tech Russian or Chinese weaponry that are purchased on the market by a developing nation. Venezuela and Iran have purchased Su-30s, and there are reports that Terhan attempted to buy some Chinese J-10s. These fighters may be a threat but they are in such small quantities that the current fleet of F-22s (capped at 187) would be more than enough to effectively deal with it. Otherwise most developing world airforces predominately consist of Vietnam-era Russian and Chinese fighters. The Taliban’s ”air forice” was a joke. The F-15 could easily achieve air-superiority.

As Bosnia, Kosovo, and the 2006 Iraq Surge show the ground war is the vital factor. Thus, the air force should be built around a supportive role for our ground forces instead of a first-strike orientation. Stealth planes will not be important and will be underutilized in the future foreseable conflicts. This is not to say that first-strike capable aircraft are useless. These aircraft can be vital for eliminating key ground defense positions and anti-aircraft batteries. However, to convert the entire fleet to extremely expensive high-tech aircraft is a mistake. Once boots hit the ground the element of surprise is lost. Instead the military should focus on upgrading the current fleet of F-15s/F-16s/F-18s and potentially consider the  development of a fighter with the performance of the F-22 minues some of the advanced electronics and stealth capabilities. That being said, the fifth generation F-35 is coming in at around $83 million per unit and hopefully will be the answer.

The battlefield of the near future is going to be very similar to what our Marines currently face in Helmand Province. The Air Force and their F-22 are geared for the wrong fight. The air strategy developed during the 1990s works well against decently developed countries with conventional militaries. But over the next two decades or so the most pressing security threats that could turn into “hot conflicts” will come from developing countries with low tech/unconventional forces (although North Korea may be very vulnerable to the air warfare doctrine). Effort needs to be placed on cost-effective and easily deployable weapons systems that directly benefits our ground troops and enable them to successfully carry out their missions.

It has been over a month since Iranians took to the streets in protest over election results. It seemed that the violent crack down on the part of the government was going to contain public displays of defiance. The opposition never went away, and there were constant reports of small pockets of street protests and other forms of defiance. However, today the opposition mounted its largest display of defiance since the days immediately following the election.
Rafsanjani gave the Friday sermon this week and thousands of opposition supporters attended and took to the streets. The opposition is not going away and it can still mount a considerable street presence.
At this point the government of Iran should be extremely afraid for the future of its power and influence. As long as they ignore the demands of the opposition, there will always be a challenge to the legitimacy of the government. Force has not been enough to crush the opposition. Meanwhile, the spontaneous and decentralized nature of the opposition makes it extremely hard to thwart. However, if the government gives into the demands of the opposition it may potentially undermine its position. As we have seen in past government-opposition interactions when the government begins to reform following a strong arm period the government elite tends to lose control and finds itself either out of power or extremely marginalized and limited. In the case of Iran, the government put itself in a position where it can’t implement reforms or accept opposition demands without reversing earlier decisions and statements. These reversals disrupt continuity and bring instability.

The last few weeks have turned into a “wait and see” approach by both the government and opposition. The government hopes to outlast the opposition and it certainly has the tools to do so (support of the security apparatus, considerable mass support, and a fair amount of international recognition).  But the opposition has its own strengths that are keeping it alive. Today was a victory for the opposition because it showed its staying power. Rafsanjani effectively publicly endorsed the opposition, and the opposition made a strong showing on the streets. Furthermore, the opposition has strong allies in the Iranian elite and clerical establishment.

Both sides have staying power and are entrenched into their positions. Neither side seems ready to give into the other’s demands. A month later and the opposition is still going strong which suggests that this conflict will not be going away any time soon.

Two weeks after Iran’s tumultuous elections it’s now clear that whatever political conflict has emerged in Iran will not be resolved any time soon. Rather, the nature and direction of change in the Islamic Republic will remain obscure, and whatever resolution this conflict may have will only be found in a protracted process. Whether civil unrest will continue to foment and mature like it did in Iran’s 1979 Revolution or whether a political solution by the establishment can be had remains to be seen. Iran’s social unrest has certainly derailed Obama’s diplomatic efforts to engage Iran on the nuclear issue, but the likely paths Iran’s social unrest could take may also provide new diplomatic opportunities for the US moderate Iranian politics. Because directly meddling in Iran’s domestic politics is out of the question, just how much pressure the US can assert over Iran will largely hinge on what approach Iran’s political establishments will now take.

There is little the US can do if Iran’s government continues to crack down on political dissenters and maintain a conservative hardline. However, that possibility threatens the internal legitimacy and political stability of Iran and would more likely lead to an overthrow of the political system like in 1979. On the other hand if crackdowns do little to quail the civil unrest the Iranian establishment may become more moderate on its own in self preservation. Changing the political structure or removing from power hardline conservatives that have become the target of the protests could end political dissent and preserve Iran’s political institutions. This solution largely depends on whether the opposition can organize and find support within the political establishment and Iran’s military to overrule Supreme Leader Khamenei. However, such a process has no guarantee of working, and could stymie or become subject to crackdowns and purges.

The Iranian establishment could also attempt to quiet protestors and consolidate its political legitimacy by looking outside instead of inside its own country. It is this solution which could give the US some sway over Iran. This approach could come in two forms. The more direct and simpler form would be if the Iranian government tries to push for international recognition as a source of legitimacy. Although such a push may provide few diplomatic openings for the US at first, if Iran’s internal unrest worsens it could elevate the value of such a gesture to the Iranian government. Even so, the influence and effectiveness of such a gesture remains a long shot at best. More substantively, Iran’s government could seek to consolidate its political legitimacy by reintegrating itself to the world economy. Such an attempt would seek to co opt the opposition by appeasing their positions on Iranian policy held during the election. However, this solution would also require Iran’s government to make concessions to western powers that it may be unwilling to carry out—including concessions over its nuclear program—which also makes this possibility a long shot.

Any potential for US diplomatic engagement with Iran will rely on how desperate the Iranian government is to maintain its power in a potential political overthrow by opposition forces (should they persist). The key to any chance for the US to draw out concessions from Iran’s current government in the future will depend on the state of Iran’s internal stability and its willingness to seek political survival over its desire to preserve a political hardline. So long as Iran’s political establishment exhibits the desire to survive at any cost, the US will have the opportunity diplomatically squeeze Iran in an uncomfortable double bind that forces it to choose between a gamble with an increasingly discontent society and a compromise of its hardline policy. Of course, successful silencing of dissent is just as likely an outcome and would lead to a more extreme Iran which would prove even more difficult to engage with. In any case, Iran’s political circumstances have fundamentally changed, forcing the Obama to reassess his Iran policy. Nonetheless, just as it has ruined old opportunities, such a change may provide new ones.